British foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq:how their Salafi-Jihadist narratives are communicated by Regan, Aisling
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 
downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at 
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/  
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT 
Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed 
under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 
licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes.
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 
other rights are in no way affected by the above. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
British foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq

















British Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: 



























Submitted for the degree of MPhil at the School of Security Studies 
KING’S COLLEGE LONDON 





Abstract          p.3 
 
Acknowledgements         p.4 
 
Introduction         p.6 
 
Chapter 1 – Methodology       p.10 
 
Chapter 2 – Narratives       p.14 
 
Chapter 3 – Radicalisation and Terrorist Use of Internet   p.26 
 
Chapter 4 – Ideology        p.41 
 
Chapter 5 – The Ummah       p.56 
 
Chapter 6 – Identity        p.73 
 
Conclusion         p.93 
 




























What factors contribute to a British citizen undertaking to travel to Syria and or Iraq 
and engage in violent actions? This is a perennial question for researchers, 
academics, security and intelligence personnel and there is no one answer that can 
encapsulate the complexity of the question. But, there is a perspective that suggests 
narratives play an important role in changing the attitude, beliefs, and intentions 
that can culminate in travel to the conflict zone for extremist purposes.  
 
This project examines narratives, how they are different to stories, and identifies 
their constituent parts in detail. It argues that a narrative is a very persuasive means 
of communication, especially a master narrative which is distinguished by its 
robustness and how deeply embedded it is in a particular culture. Using content 
posted on Twitter, analysing research conducted by academics and think tanks, and 
capitalising on social media content featured in news media, this project 
demonstrates how some British foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq communicate a 
Salafist-Jihadist ideology through narrative means.1 The veracity of their religious 
commitment is difficult to qualify but notwithstanding this, evidence suggests they 
do espouse this strict literalist interpretation of Islam.  
 
This thesis examines radicalisation and the range of push and pull factors which are 
then articulated in a narrative context. It outlines how the Ummah has become a 
potent global, albeit imagined, community and how this forms just one of the pull 
factors that young British Muslims may experience. A large body of commentary 
exists as to the role of Salafist-Jihadist ideology as another pull factor and both sides 
of the argument are outlined with the evidence weighing in favour of it playing an 
important part. Why some individuals come to be in Syria and Iraq in the first place is 
attributable to a range of push factors, with identity being cited as critical in some of 
the literature. This project examines the veracity of this claim amid a confluence of 
factors such as (perceived) grievance, relative deprivation and group membership.  
 
1 For the purposes of this project, I have adopted David Malet’s definition of a foreign fighter as ‘non-
citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts’ from David Malet Foreign 




From the period 2012-2017, I was an Intelligence Officer in the Irish Army, with 
specific responsibility for International Counter Terrorism (ICT). When I commenced 
working on the ICT desk, Europe still had one eye on the Libyan crisis and for Ireland, 
having a large Libyan diaspora, this had been the focus of much intelligence 
gathering efforts in the preceding years. However, the other eye was firmly fixed on 
Syria and had been since late 2011.   
 
The seed was sown for this project during a deployment as the Irish National 
Intelligence Cell team leader in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
Mission in 2013-2014. I would frequently travel through the villages in South 
Lebanon which were known to have strong support for Hizb’Allah such as Marun 
ar’Ras, Ayta Chaab, Bint Jbeil (all considered flashpoints for those familiar with the 
2006 Israeli invasion of South Lebanon) and observe increasing numbers of glossy, 





2 The image displayed was taken from an article by Philip Smith entitled “Hizballah Cavalcade: 
Hizballah’s Multiplying Qusayr Martyrs” Jihadology, available at 
https://jihadology.net/2013/05/20/hizballah-cavalcade-hizballahs-multiplying-qusayr-martyrs/ (last 
accessed 29 May 2018). 
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In the six months I was there my team tracked the numbers of local Hizb’Allah 
fighters killed in Syria and partially, the collection involved monitoring these posters 
on drives through villages. Such visible reminders of Shia Muslim martyrdom were 
thought-provoking and forced reflection on why would a British citizen chose to 
travel to Syria and opt to partake in violence against civilians and was it really for the 
sake of a religious ideology? Hizb’Allah’s involvement was far more complex and a 
reflection of strategic alliances and state sponsorship of the hybrid terrorist 
organisation. By the time I had travelled to Lebanon in 2013, we already knew of 
Irish citizens who had departed Ireland for Syria. With a different environment and 
focus from the more routine ICT work as it pertained to Ireland’s national security 
allowed me to begin to critically ask the ‘why’ as opposed to the ‘how’ questions 
concerning motivations for foreign terrorist fighter’s travel that being a front-line 
intelligence officer required. The choice to examine Great Britain as opposed to 
Ireland was informed by two factors; 1) choosing Ireland would have created a direct 
conflict of interest with my employment at the time and 2) there was a much greater 
public interest in Great Britain correlated with a large number of citizens who had 
chosen the path and therefore a greater dearth of information available to analyse. 
 
Throughout my entire career and academic journey my family have been a constant 
source of motivation and support, without which I certainly would not be where I am 
today. My primary supervisor Frank Foley who plucked me from the hat, and who 
undoubtedly must have felt during the last four years that he drew the short straw! 
Consistent in guidance and constructive feedback coupled with patience and 
motivation at crucial junctures, I consider myself extremely fortunate to have had 
Frank as a supervisor. To Peter Neumann, whose own research provided much of the 
analysis for this project, it was an honour to have had Peter as my second supervisor, 
his comments and suggestions were invaluable.  Finally, to my future husband, and 
best friend, whose support, encouragement and patience has been the rails that 








As the Syrian civil war evolved into an armed insurrection security and terrorism 
experts, assisted by open source information, became alarmed at the number of 
foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq. While foreign fighters are not new, the 
conflict in Syria and Iraq has mobilised the largest number to date.3 Coinciding with 
the exponential increase and influence of social media applications and platforms, 
Syria and Iraq became the “five star jihad” locations for British foreign fighters.4  
 
Many analyses of the foreign fighter phenomenon have referred to “narratives” and 
how there has been a pervasive “terrorist narrative” that was targeting European 
Muslims and swaying them toward a particular course of action. This project aims to 
critically examine the role of narratives in the mobilisation of British foreign fighters. 
Several hypotheses form the basis of this project and are as follows: the internet has 
impacted on the radicalisation process, and made it easier to access terrorist 
content; certain elements of the young male British Muslim population are 
experiencing an identity crises; the Ummah is a powerful concept which can provide 
a collective “us” identity and; social media facilitated the dispersion of a Salafist-
Jihadist ideology through a narrative framework. 
 
In reviewing the relevant literature for this thesis, it was discovered there is little 
specifically on the topic of terrorist narratives. Historically, and across the spectrums 
of social sciences there exists large quantities of research conducted on why and 
how people become terrorists, but this is not the primary objective of this project. 
The correlation between terrorism and narratives is a relatively new area dominated 
by policy papers and commentary that more routinely assume a reactive stance to a 
specific incident or are highly subjective opinion pieces intended to influence policy, 
rather than systematic and empirically based research.  
 
 
3 Lorenzo Vidino, “European Foreign Fighters in Syria: Dynamics and Responses” European View, 13:2 
(2014), pp 217–224. 
4 Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and 
Iraq” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38:1 (2015), pp. 1-22. 
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The existing research drawn upon in this thesis can be divided into four main 
strands; the theory of narratives; social identity theory; ideology; and radicalisation 
theory. The central focus of this research project cannot be addressed by confining 
oneself to the field of terrorism and security studies and therefore, this review of 
relevant literature and theory draws on other disciplines primarily sociology and in 
particular contemporary social theory, communication studies and the field of social 
psychology.  
 
While acknowledging the mutual interdependence between these four themes, I 
have divided them into three separate categories for the sake of clarity. The first two 
chapters establish the conceptual framework of the thesis, drawing on a range of 
literature relevant to narratives and radicalisation. Chapter 1 will examine the 
literature regarding narratives and their use in terrorist communications. This is the 
foundational block for this project and the chapter will outline how a Salafist-Jihadist 
master narrative comprises the setting, the participants, the challenge and the 
outcome. Chapter 2 addresses radicalisation and the issue of terrorist use of new 
media particularly Twitter. The empirical analysis of the thesis is offered in the 
remaining three chapters. Chapter 3 addresses the role of ideology, specifically the 
Salafist-Jihadist strand and how this has morphed over time in response to global 
events for the most part. Chapter 4 features a deep-dive on the Ummah and its role 
in attracting foreigners to make Hijrah to Syria. Chapter 5 illustrates the importance 
of social identity theory in examining the mobilisation of British Muslims travelling 
abroad for extremist purposes. The conclusion summarises the findings of previous 
chapters and discusses the implications of them.  
 
British Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: A Primer 
The historical perspective on foreign fighters is crucial to understanding their 
engagement in Syria and Iraq. While much public commentary from 2013 took the 
position that the large-scale movement of people to a conflict-zone beyond their 
own borders was an entirely new phenomenon, academics and researchers argued 
otherwise. A seminal article by Thomas Hegghammer examined the historical 
engagement of foreign fighters in conflicts in the Muslim world since 1980, and 
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identified that between 10,000 and 30,000 individuals had inserted themselves into 
global conflicts since then.5 The number of Britons estimated to have travelled to 
Syria and Iraq is 850, although the true number will never be known.6 
 
Relying on academic and research reporting sources reveals the average individual 
profile to be between 18-30 years of age and of South Asian origin.7 This is 
attributable to the fact that approximately two thirds of Muslims in Britain are 
identified as being of South Asian heritage.8 This contrasts with the foreign fighters 
of France and Belgium whose origins are tied to their country’s colonial pasts, North 
Africa predominantly. Pantucci’s analysis from 2014 of social media featuring Britons 
in Syria concluded that London, Portsmouth, Brighton and Birmingham were the 
greatest feeder regions in the UK.9 Pantucci identified links to serious criminality 
among Britain’s community of fighters in Syria, which was also a feature of ICSR’s 
analyses.10 However, the profile of volunteer changed over the course of the conflict, 
specifically in the aftermath of ISIS creation of their de facto Islamic State when they 
began to search for experienced professionals to assist in the consolidation of their 
state-like features such as doctors and engineers. The first tranche or wave of 
Britons to travel to Syria were described as being motivated by humanitarian 
reasons.11 ICSR’s research also found recent connections to higher education as a 
feature of the British foreign fighter profile.12 It is assessed that the majority of 
Britons joined ISIS, but that a presence was found in other fighting groups including 
 
5 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad” 
International Security, 35:3 (Winter 2010/11), pp. 53–94. 
6 BBC News “Who are Britain’s Jihadists?” available at https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32026985 (last 
accessed 23 May 2018). 
7 Bibi van Ginkel and Eva Entenmann (Eds.) “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union 
Profiles, Threats & Policies”, ICCT, April 2016, p.40. 
8 Ceri Peach, ‘Britain's Muslim Population: an Overview’, in Tahir Abbas (Ed) Muslim Britain: 
Communities Under Pressure (London: Zed Books, 2005) pp. 18–46, p.20. 
9 Raffaello Pantucci “The British Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria” CTC Sentinel, 7:5 (2014), pp.17-
21. 
10 Rajan Basra, Peter R. Neumann and Claudia Brunner Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European 
Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus, ICSR, October 2016. 
11  Mary Anne Weaver “Her Majesty’s Jihadists”, The New York Times, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/magazine/her-majestys-jihadists.html  (last accessed 27 
November 2016). 
12  Shiraz Maher “British Foreign Fighters in Syria”, ICSR, available at 
https://icsr.info/2013/10/15/british-foreign-fighters-in-syria/ (last accessed August 2017). 
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Jabhat al-Nusra (al Qaeda’s original official Syrian affiliate), Jund al-Aqsa and Katiba 
al-Mujajireen (the battalion of migrants).13 The reason Britons ended up fighting 
alongside ISIS in the greatest numbers can be attributed to the fact that the more 
extreme groups were better resourced, fought harder, displayed more discipline, 
and attested to being better motivated.14 This gives afforded them an advantage, 
both against government forces and when competing for recruits or territory with 


































13 Shiv Malik and Aisha Gani, “One British jihadi killed in Syria and Iraq every three weeks” 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24/british-jihadis-killed-
syria-iraq (last accessed 24 October 2014). 
14 Richard Barrett Foreign Fighters in Syria, (New York: anThe Soufan Group, June 2014) p.10.  
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Arguably, Syria was the first conflict in which a significant number of British fighters 
documented their involvement in conflict in real-time. Therefore, social media 
represented an essential source of information and inspiration for them. This was a 
passion project driven by a personal desire to learn about the role of Salafist-Jihadist 
ideology in Western Europeans, specifically British, travelling to Syria and Iraq. The 
project utilized a combination of primary research methods and exploited 
documentary sources where available. What follows is a description of how material 
was accessed, the timescale that was involved and how ethical considerations were 
dealt with. Reference will also be made to the limitations of the research methods 
employed.  
 
Twitter Data  
I chose Twitter as the primary source owing to its popularity among the foreign 
fighter movement, the ability to view content without logging in, viewing content 
without the account holder’s explicit awareness and the use of the hashtag function 
to indicate support for ideas or people beyond what can be contained within the 
original message. For this project I monitored Twitter accounts in real-time using a 
“listening in” account, and all of the Twitter content included was accessed without 
“following” anyone or was it obtained in a clandestine or misrepresentative manner.  
There was no contact that was accessed which required permission from its owners. 
This project was undertaken by an English-speaking person, it should be noted that 
there is a language and cultural bias because of the information available. The 
sample pool was limited to those which were displayed in the English language only, 
past experience with free services such as Google translate revealed a patchy at best 
service.  
 
In order to mitigate against Twitter account closure or “take-downs” and the 
potential for broken or expired URLs from media articles I saved content as either 
“screenshots” or as a “pdf” documents using the existing software on a MacBook. 
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The comment, like and retweet function provided further datapoints for 
investigation. I monitored 9 Twitter accounts in total and my study did not employ 
any software or tools to conduct aggregation, visualisation or analysis, it was a 
manual process which impacted the number of primary sources collected and 
featured in this project.15 In the majority of cases, these accounts surfaced through 
news stories, blogs, and reports released by law enforcement agencies and think 
tanks and academics who would repost or link to the primary data. 
 
Retention of Data and Ethics  
The data which I accessed for the purposes of this study is retained on the internal 
hard drive of my personal laptop which is password protected. In addition my files 
are also backed up to an external hard drive. None of the documentation is stored 
on servers in the cloud. There is no unique communications between any account 
monitored and myself given that there was no interaction on my part, my account 
was purely a listening-in one. On the basis of the primary research methodology 
being solely reliant on publicly available information, this project did not require pre-
approval from the Ethics committee at King’s College London.  
 
Use of Secondary Research Material 
Secondary documentation was crucial and the necessity to build on the information I 
was building from my own social media collection. This project leveraged heavily, 
existing published research by institutions and academic who had a greater dataset 
and ability to aggregate the data. I collected a vast number of reports by academic 
institutions, journal articles, book chapters and conference papers dating from 
January 2014. These reports further provided bibliographies, which specified other 
useful sources. During the data collection phase I also had access to SITE Intel which 
provided valuable analysis of social media content from Syria and Iraq.  
 
I monitored British media outlets, from the tabloid Daily Mail to the broadsheet 
 
15 The primary accounts monitored are identified by their Twitter handle for ease of reference and 
include: @abuanasmujahid; @al_britani; @qawlu_sawarim; @al_britaniyaa; @jannamahtain; 
@shami_witness; @I_Jaman; @abu_hussain_al_britani; @abu_rahash_britani; @r_tawheed. 
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Times and their fervent interest in the topic produced plenty of research material. I 
retained articles which were important to this project in “pdf” format in a folder on 
my hard drive in the event that they became unavailable in the future. On occasion I 
broke from purely analysing data from Twitter, when my attention was drawn to a 
Facebook post from a third-party secondary source, such as a newspaper article. I 
was conscious of the conundrum that mainstream media’s reliance on social media 
has dangers as well as benefits. Journalists with limited access on the ground rely 
heavily on online content, which makes verification quite challenging for a journalist 
on a deadline in the Syrian context and this reliance creates the real risk of some 
misleading, incorrect attribution making it into mass media. In order to try and 
mitigate this I also collected publications by think tanks, policy institutes and 
conference summaries which were invaluable given that many involved analysing 
primary material obtained through interactions with Britons who were fighting in 
Syria and Iraq. 
 
Timeline 
The study was undertaken officially in the Autumn of 2014 but Twitter data 
collection took place from May 2014 until March 2016. The conclusion time 
coincided with a phase when primary material in the English language became more 
difficult to access on Twitter. This was due to a number of factors including a 
restriction on fighter’s access to internet connectivity, a recognition that their online 
activities made them easier to geolocate and target with air strikes (the case of 
Jihadi John for example), that their social media output was attributable and could re 
result in prosecution if they were to return home In relation to secondary sources, 
and a coordinated response by the social media companies to de-platform suspected 
foreign fighters.  I continued to collate my primary research findings with published 
material until the summer of 2018. Academic research on the Syrian conflict is still 
being published in journals as material ordinarily takes longer to come to print. As 
the events in Syria were relatively recent when this project began, journal articles at 
that time dealing with the foreign fighter phenomenon specific the Syrian conflict 




At the time of undertaking, my employment in the Irish Army curtailed by ability to 
engage in primary field work. If circumstances were different, it would have been 
ideal to travel to the UK to collect data, preferably through semi-structured 
interviews, with those engaged in the monitoring of social media on a daily basis 
such as ICSR researchers and those charged with responding to the issue such as 
members of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism.  
 
Being a part-time, distance-learning student in full-time employment poses a trifecta 
of challenges, and I did not seek any funding on the basis that I was limited in my 
ability to engage with the academic community in King’s College and the London 
area in general. This project was entirely self-funded. Being in full-time employment 
for the duration while it challenged my time management skills, it enabled a project 
of this depth and longevity to be completed. If I were a full-time funded student I 
would like to have considered following a similar path to Quintan Wiktorowicz and 
interview some of those who had returned to the UK from fighting in Syria and Iraq 
to ask them of their motivations and if at all possible collate their responses to in-














CHAPTER 2 – Narratives 
Introduction 
But when the forbidden months have passed, then fight and slay the pagans 
[mushrikin] wherever you find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in 
wait for them in every stratagem [of war], but if they repent and establish 
prayers and practice charity, then open the way for them, for God is forgiving, 
merciful.16 
 
Narrative theory features across the disciplines of social theory, communications 
studies and more recently security and terrorism studies. However, the definition 
and conceptual framework subsequently varies greatly. Both in terrorism research 
and counter-terrorism practitioner and policy-maker circles narratives are a popular 
term of late. Cristina Archetti asserts that interest in narratives originates 
predominantly post-9/11 with the increasing realisation that terrorism and counter-
terrorism is not confined to the sphere of security and military dimensions. This 
assertion is reflective of the general mutation of counter-terrorism into the realms of 
communication, perceptions and persuasion following recognition that these 
elements are now fundamental to the response by state actors in particular.17   
 
This chapter will examine narrative theory in depth distinguishing a narrative from a 
story and identifying the key components of the former. The idea of a master 
narrative will be introduced and how its transnational and embedded nature is what 
distinguishes it from a narrative. I will debate how a narrative can affect a person’s 
attitudes or beliefs and balance that with individual agency within sociological 
theory. It concludes with a discussion of the concept of transportation into the 
narrative world – a concept which provides insights into how narratives can facilitate 
the consumer to be translocated into the fictional world where the (master) 
narrative wishes to bring you.  
 
16 Qur’an, surah 9, verse 5 known as the “Verse of the Sword”, this is the most quoted surah by 
Islamist extremists according to research conducted by Jeffrey R. Halverson, R. Bennett Furlow and 
Steven R. Corman How Islamist Extremists Quote the Qur’an (Arizona: Centre for Strategic 
Communication, 2012). 
17 Cristina Archetti, “Narrative Wars: Understanding Terrorism in the Era of Global 
Interconnectedness,” in Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle (Eds) Forging the 
World: Strategic Narratives and International Relations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2013). 
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What is a Narrative? 
Although there are conceptual disagreements on what constitutes narrative, there 
are common definitional themes that, at the simplest level, state that narratives  can 
be defined as the representation of an event or a series of events.18 In general, 
researchers on this subject agree that narratives are story lines that explain events 
convincingly, express a sense of identity and belonging and from which inferences 
can be drawn.19 The sense of identity feature of a narrative will be extrapolated 
upon in further sections but it can be surmised to suggest that narratives are the 
stories we tell ourselves and others about the world in which we live and are 
therefore fundamental to our identity.  
 
Braddock and Horgan in their research on counter-narratives for violent extremism 
identified a narrative as ‘any cohesive and coherent account of events with an 
identifiable beginning, middle, and end about characters engaged in actions that 
result in questions or conflicts for which answers or resolutions are provided’.20 This 
is identified as the most comprehensive definition at present and will be adopted for 
the purpose of this project. It is their explicit identification of a narrative as providing 
a response, resolution or reaction impetus for the audience that is of relevance and 
their omission of the label story unlike Archetti that results in its selection. 
 
The distinction between a narrative and a story is important to this thesis. Stories 
have been with us throughout the course of human history. They have been 
demonstrated to affect our emotional states21, our belief systems22, our behavioural 
 
18 H. Porter Abbott, The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
19 Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs (London: Routledge, 2006) p. 22; David 
Betz, ‘The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency’, Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, 19:4 (2008) p. 515. 
20  Kurt Braddock and John Horgan “Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating 
Counternarratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 39:5 (2016), 
pp.381-404, p383. See also Leslie J. Hinyard and Matthew W. Kreuter, “Using Narrative 
Communication as a Tool for Health Behavior Change: A Conceptual, Theoretical, and Empirical 
Overview”, Health Education and Behavior, 34:5 (2007) p.778. 
21 Patrick C. Hogan, The Mind and its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotions (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Keith Oately, “A Taxonomy of the Emotions of Literary Response 
and a Theory of Identification in Fictional Narrative” Poetics, 23 (1995), pp.53-74; Keith Oatley 
“Emotions and the Story Worlds of Fiction” in Melanie C. Green, Jeffrey J. Strange and Timothy C. 
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patterns23, and our responses to the world around us.24 The term narrative is used 
liberally in public discourse and language but is often employed simply as a synonym 
for story or anecdote. Authors such as Halverson et al. and Bernardi et al. address 
this distinction succinctly.25 They define a story as requiring the following dimensions 
‘time (sequence of events and actions); space (settings); representations 
(characters); and rhetoric (communication of an idea)’, and a narrative as being a 
system of inter-related stories.26  
 
Master Narratives 
Mona Baker’s research on narrative theory is cited widely in the literature for its 
comprehensive and critical evaluation of narrative types.27 She identifies meta-
narratives as ‘particularly potent public narratives that persist over long periods of 
time and influence the lives of people across a wide range of settings’.28 Pioneering 
research by Halverson et.al has revealed what they term a master narrative, defined 
as ‘a transnational narrative which is deeply embedded in a particular culture’.29 
 
Brock (Eds) Narrative Impact: Social and Cognitive Foundations (New Jersey: Lawrence Erblaum, 2002) 
pp.39-69. 
22 Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock “The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public 
Narratives” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, (2000) pp.401-421; Deborah A. Prentice, 
Richard A. Gerrig and Daniel A. Bailis “What Readers Bring to the Processing of Fictional Texts” 
Psychonomic Bulletin Review, 4, (1997), pp.416-420; S. Christian Wheeler, Melanie C. Green and 
Timothy C. Brock “Fictional Narratives Change Beliefs: Replications of Prentice, Gerrig and Bailis 
(1997) with Mixed Corroboration”, Psychological Bulletin Review, 6, (1999) pp.136-141. 
23 Leslie J. Hinyard and Matthew W. Kreuter, “Using Narrative Communication as a Tool for Health 
Behavior Change, pp.777-792. 
24 Jerome Bruner Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986); 
Michael F. Dahlstrom, “The Role of Causality in Information Acceptance in Narratives: An Example 
from Science Communication” Communications Research 37:6 (2010), pp.857-875; Sonya Dal Cin, 
Mark P. Zanna and Geoffrey T. Fong, “Narrative Persuasion and Overcoming Resistance” in Eric S. 
Knowles and Jay A. Lin (Eds.) Resistance and Persuasion (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
2004) pp.175-192; Richard J. Gerrig, Experiencing Narrative World: On the Psychological Activities of 
Reading (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993); Jeffrey J. Strange, “How Fictional Tales Wag Real-World 
Beliefs” in Melanie C. Green, Jeffrey J. Strange and Timothy C. Brock (Eds) Narrative Impact: Social 
and Cognitive Foundations (New Jersey: Lawrence Erblaum, 2002) pp.263-286. 
25 Daniel L. Bernardi, Pauline Hope Cheong, Chris Lundry and Scott W. Ruston, Narrative Landmines: 
Rumors, Islamist Extremism and the Struggle for Strategic Influence (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2012). 
26 Daniel L. Bernardi et.al. Narrative Landmines, p.171.  
27 Mona Baker, Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account (London: Routledge, 2006); Mona Baker, 
“Narratives of Terrorism and Security: ‘Accurate’, Translations, Suspicious Frames” Critical Studies on 
Terrorism 3:3 (2010), pp.347-364. 
28 Mona Baker, “Narratives of Terrorism and Security, p.351. 
29 Jeffrey R. Halverson et.al. Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism, p.24. 
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They hold that we connect events and new information to our understanding of 
existing narratives or master narratives and that a master narrative is a powerful 
resource for motivating action since it has immense resilience.30 Their contention 
that a master narrative is distinctly different to a narrative is qualified by stating that 
the former is deeply embedded in a social system that is chronologically reproduced 
told again and again over time and extremely resistant to change. The level of 
influence a narrative can have is debated in more detail below but it is agreed with 
Archetti’s assessment that ‘the master narrative, or indeed any narrative is unlikely 
to be absorbed as it is but filtered and appropriated through the prism of the 
individual narrative’.31 Freedman argues that a master narrative is expected to 
provide the audience with what is likely to happen and what actions they are 
supposed to take without having to be explicitly told.32  This action facet of 
Freedman’s work is of substantial significance to this thesis. Furthermore, Freedman 
observes that these narratives are strategic in that ‘they do not arise spontaneously 
but are deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are 
already current’.33 
 
Why are Narratives Important? 
Hinyard and Kreuter posit that narratives are the principle method through which 
social entities like terrorist groups share information with and attempt to influence 
the public.34 They are used to teach audience members what to think and may be 
particularly effective when used to discuss issues central to terrorist groups’ 
positions, including morality, religion, personal and social values, and the meaning of 
life, for which reasoned or logical arguments are less effective.35 As Freedman 
cautions, narratives ‘are not necessarily analytical’ and ‘may rely on appeals to 
 
30 Jeffrey R. Halverson et.al. Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism p.24. 
31 Archetti, “Narrative Wars”, p.5.  
32 Jeffrey R. Halverson et.al. Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism p.25; Lawrence Freedman, The 
Transformation of Strategic Affairs p.26 
33 Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, p.22. 
34 Leslie J. Hinyard and Matthew W. Kreuter, “Using Narrative Communication as a Tool for Health 
Behavior Change, pp.777-792. 
35  George. S. Howard, “A Narrative Approach to Thinking, Cross-Cultural Psychology and 
Psychotherapy, 46:3 (1991) pp.187-197; Wendy Lutrell “Working-Class Women’s Ways of Knowing: 
Effects of Gender, Race and Class”Sociology of Education, 62, (1989) pp.33-46; Donald E. 
Polkinghorne, Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences (New York: New York Press, 1998). 
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emotion, or on suspect metaphors and dubious historical analogies’.36 Narratives are 
argued to be easier to remember than non-narrative communication and have the 
potential to generate in us real and powerful emotions.37 Furthermore because they 
commonly possess great persuasive potency, narratives are believed to be more 
difficult to resist, counter-argue, or refute.38 According to Bernardi et.al. in the 
construction of a narrative, “truth” often becomes less about facts and evidence and 
more about coherence with pre-existing and prevailing understanding.39 Baker is 
explicit in her assessment that in the construction of a narrative, some parts of the 
story are excluded and other parts are privileged, ‘so as to make the story fit the lens 
through which narrative constructors would have others see the world’.40  
 
A narrative’s effectiveness is difficult to measure empirically, but much research has 
been conducted into narrative persuasion, albeit the topic has yielded a literature 
that is largely inconsistent. Some studies have found that exposure to a narrative 
affects an individual’s beliefs and attitudes so as to align with the espoused 
viewpoints41 while others have suggested that there is little evidence to account for 
the existence a relationship between narrative and persuasion at all.42 One research 
study which involved examining thirty years of scholarship related to narratives and 
persuasion found ‘exposure to a narrative is positively related to the adoption of 
narrative-consistent viewpoints...that narratives have the potential to persuade, 
independent of context’.43   
 
36 Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, p.23. 
37 Keith Oately “Emotions and the Story Worlds of Fiction” in Melanie C. Green et.al. Narrative 
Impact; Melanie C. Green, “Narratives and Cancer Communication”, Journal of Communication 56 
(2006), pp.163-183. 
38 Michael D. Slater, “Entertainment education and the persuasive impact of narratives” in Melanie C. 
Green et.al. Narrative Impact, pp. 157–182.  
39 Daniel L. Bernardi et.al. Narrative Landmines, p.171. 
40 Mona Baker, “Narratives of Terrorism and Security”, p.352. 
41 Hyuhn-Suhck Bae (2008) “Entertainment-Education and Recruitment of Cornea Donors: The Role of 
Emotion and Issue Involvement” Journal of Health Communication, 13, (2008) pp.20-36; Hyuhn-Suhck 
Bae & Seok Kang “The Influence of Viewing an Entertainment-Education Program on Cornea Donation 
Intention: A Test of the Theory of Planned Behavior”, Health Communication, 23, (2008) pp.87-95; 
Elissa Lee & Laura Leets “Persuasive storytelling by hate groups online: Examining its effects on 
adolescents”, American Behavioral Scientist, 45, (2002) pp.927-957. 
42Laura A. Peracchio and Joan Meyers-Levy “Evaluating Persuasion-Enhancing Techniques from a 
Resource-Matching Perspective” Journal of Consumer Research, 24:2 (1997) pp.178-191. 
43 Kurt Braddock, “The Utility of Narratives for Promoting Radicalization: The Case of the 
Animal Liberation Front,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 8 (2015), pp. 38–59; Kurt Braddock and 
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The Narrative of Foreign Fighters  
According to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, ‘the messaging embedded in 
extremist products layers together a mix of ideological, political, moral, religious and 
social narratives, based on a range of real or imagined grievances’.44 Briggs and 
Frenett exemplify this assertion as they identify three main narratives which are 
motivating foreign fighters to join conflict zones worldwide, and include 
humanitarian (example given is ‘the brutality of the Regime’); ideological (the 
familiar ‘Islam is under attack’); and identity (appealing to the social identity of a 
person by claiming ‘this will make you a better person’).45  Islamist extremist 
narratives often tend to be told for specific political and ideological reasons: to 
educate Muslims about the repressive dangers of the West; to expose the prurient 
culture and colonist intentions of the West; and to inculcate Muslim’s into the 
extremist’s worldview.46  
 
This project is concerned with the narrative of British foreign fighters and while the 
totality of those volunteers are undoubtedly dispersed within different groups it is 
generally accepted that they are concentrated in the largest numbers in ISIS. 
Although ISIS split from al Qaeda in 2013, their narrative has some commonalities 
with that of AQ given their core Salafi-Jihadi ideology. Schmid argues that AQ’s 
ideology ‘is expressed in its “single narrative”’.47 This powerful ‘meta-level narrative’ 
is credited with transcending national and political boundaries while shifting 
attention towards the ‘far enemy’ in the form of the US and Europe.48 Hegghammer 
has observed that foreign fighters in Syria are largely pursuing goals framed within a 
 
James P. Dillard, “Meta-Analytic Evidence for the Persuasive Effect of Narratives on Beliefs, Attitudes, 
Intentions, and Behaviors,” Communication Monographs, 83:4 (2016), pp.446-476. 
44 Institute for Strategic Dialogue Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism, 
2013. 
45 Rachel Briggs and Ross Frenett, ‘Foreign Fighters, the Challenges of Counter-Narratives’, Institute of 
Strategic Dialogue, available at 
http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Foreign_Fighters_paper_for_website_v0.6.pdf (last accessed 12 
February 2017).  
46 Jeffry R. Halverson et.al., Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism. 
47 See Alex P. Schmid, ‘Al-Qaeda’s “Single Narrative” and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: 
The State of Knowledge’, available at http://www.icct.nl/download/file/AP-Schmid-Al-Qaedas-Single-
Narrative-January-2014.pdf (last accessed 10 April 2018).  
48 Change Institute, Studies into Violent Radicalisation: Lot 2 – The Beliefs, Ideologies and Narratives, 
2008  
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religious conflict narrative and show little solidarity with the indigenous opposition’s 
original goals. 49  According to Shapiro and Byman’s commentary on Western 
European foreign fighters motivations to travel, religious rivalry drives most of the 
recruits.50  
 
Therefore we can surmise that the narrative of ISIS rests on two main pillars which 
will be evinced in the proceeding chapters. These pillars provide justification for their 
very existence and their most heinous crimes, as without a supporting narrative, ISIS 
terrorist activity could be described as being merely reduced to random acts of 
violence. The first pillar draws on the claims that the West has subjugated Sunni 
Muslims who are “victims” of a global conspiracy and the Caliphate was founded to 
defend and protect Muslims in their fight back against Western dominance.51 The 
second pillar reveals the religious supremacy of ISIS interpretation of Islam. As a 
result of this, ISIS establishes a totalitarian and tyrannical identity which separates 
humanity into “us” the authentic Muslims who are followers and defenders of the 
Caliphate and the “others” who are either infidels or apostates who deserve death if 
they fail to pledge allegiance to the Caliph Al-Baghdadi. The status as followers of 
ISIS and true Muslims is their single identity – no other strands of personality or 
identity is permissible.52 
 
A narrative’s primary function as evidenced in the above sections is to make sense of 
a body of data, whether it is a scene in a movie, a passage in a novel or the elements 
of information an individual collects about local, regional, or world events. What will 
follow in the immediate paragraphs is a critical analysis of the social construction of 
narratives as it is my contention, having conducted the initial review on narrative 
 
49  Thomas Hegghammer, "Syria's Foreign Fighters," Foreign Policy, available at 
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/12/09/syrias_foreign_fighters (last accessed 18 
September 2017).  
50 Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “Homeward Bound? Don't Hype the Threat of Returning 
Jihadists” Foreign Affairs, 30 Sept 2014. 
51 Daan Weggemans, Edwin Bakker, and Peter Grol, “Who are They and Why do They Go? The 
Radicalisation and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism, 8:4 (2014), pp. 100–110; Edwin Bakker and Peter Grol, “Motives and Considerations of 
Potential Foreign Fighters from the Netherlands,” International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT) 
Policy Brief , July 2015. 
52 Alex Heck, “Images, Visions and Narrative Identity Formation of ISIS”, Global Discourse, 7:2-3 (2017) 
pp.244-259, p.246. 
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theory, that much of the existing research on terrorist narratives fails to adequately 
account for the fact that narratives are central to the construction of identity. 
Through the lens of the competing functionalist approach versus the symbolic 
interaction paradigm, the importance of narratives will be examined.  
 
The Role of Agency in Narratives 
 
Too often policymakers, communication strategists, and even social scientists assume 
that all texts are read and absorbed identically across a population. We know, however, 
that individual readers frequently produce meanings that are “outside the 
mainstream”. Humanities scholarship has long recognised this individual agency and 
refers to the practice of producing an alternate interpretation as “reading against the 
text”53 
 
Recalling the definition of meta-narratives according to Mona Baker as ‘particularly 
potent public narratives that persist over long periods of time and influence the lives 
of people across a wide range of settings’, it is the question of how persuasive a 
narrative can be which is important to this thesis.54 Reviewing the relevant literature 
on narratives, it is essential to question agency and its role. Agency can be located 
according to two contrasting views: it is either a ‘subject position’ that is determined 
by dominant discourses and master narratives, or it embodies the self-creating (if 
not self-inventing) subject. 
 
Archetti’s research suggests an alternative understanding of the concept of 
narrative, one which is based on the notion that narratives are socially and 
relationally constructed rather than being merely scripted messages”’.55 According 
to her, narratives are social products in two respects. First, a narrative does not exist 
independently from individual agency. Secondly, a narrative is a collective 
construction.56 ‘The problem of structure and agency has rightly come to be seen as 
the basic issue in modern social theory’.57 Structure, the institution for example, is 
associated with “macro-sociology” and theories such as structural functionalism. 
Agency, the individual for instance, is more allied with “micro-sociology” and an 
 
53 Daniel L. Bernardi et.al., Narrative Landmines, p.22. 
54 Mona Baker, “Narratives of Terrorism and Security”, p. 351. 
55 Cristina Archetti, “Narrative Wars”, p.2. 
56 Christina Archetti “Narrative Wars”, p.2. 
57 Margaret Archer, Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). 
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example of such a theoretical framework is symbolic interactionism. The following 
sections will examine the concept of narratives from Archetti’s viewpoint, examining 
their structural and “agentic” characteristics.  
 
Agency and Structure: How Individuals Actively Create Meaning 
Terrorism is a social activity driven by group dynamics as well as root causes and 
motivations. Individuals do things in groups that they would never do on their own.58 
Social ties do not just exist with people we are in contact with but are also indirect 
and articulated through a sense of belonging to imagined communities.59 As Linde 
contends that ‘individual’s life story is not the property of that individual alone, but 
also belongs to others who have shared the events narrated – or were placed to 
have opinions about them’.60  
 
Recalling some of the discussion on narrative definitions in the previous section, a 
facet is their collective nature, that they are powerful resources for motivating and 
are deeply embedded in a particular culture. Such assertions inspire the examination 
of narratives from a functionalist perspective. Criticism of functionalists generally, 
centre on their treatment of human behaviour as if it were merely the product of 
structural factors. Rather than taking a purely functionalist perspective, it is 
analytically useful to add an emphasis on the role of agency. Narratives, it has been 
demonstrated, can affect individual’s perception of themselves, leading to 
temporary changes in self-concept, particularly when individuals identify with a 
character.61 The individual has a place in the narrative process, agents adjust stories 
to fit their own identities, and they will tailor “reality” to fit their stories.62 
 
 
 58 For more on this see Max Abrams “What Terrorists Really Want” International Security 32:4 (2008) 
pp. 78-105. 
59 Cristina Archetti “Narrative Wars”, p.3. 
60 Charlotte Linde Working the Past: Narrative and Institutional Memory (Oxford: Oxford Univesity 
Press, 2009) p.4. 
61 Marc Sestir and Melanie C. Green, “You are What You Watch: Identification and Transportation 
Effects on Temporary Self-Concept” Social Influence 54:3 (2010) pp.272-288. 
62 Margaret Somers “The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A relational and network approach” 
Theory and Society, 23 (1994) p.618. 
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The recognition of individual agency in the reading of the narrative is discussed by 
Stuart Hall who argues that the interpretation of a narrative or its “decoding” does 
not follow prescriptively and a priori from the way the narrative is encoded.63 This is 
referred to as the post-structural and cognitive constructivist model approach and 
allows for and gives a significant role to the decoding reader as well as the encoder 
storytellers.64 Hall’s and other post-structural approaches allow for a more subtle 
understanding of human agency, placing it squarely in the context of culture, social 
formation, and experience.65 
 
In the theory of symbolic interactionism, personal agency is crucial as the individual 
is viewed as an active constructor of their own conduct who interprets, evaluate, 
define and map out their own action rather than as passive beings who are impinged 
upon by outside forces.66 Herbert Blumer, believed theories such as structural 
functionalism ‘ignored the crucial forces by which actors bestow the forces acting on 
them and their own behaviours with meaning’.67  Blumer did not deny the existence 
of structure; what he decried is the overemphasis on the importance of structural 
matter in determining people’s conduct.68 
 
Somers’ seminal work on the role of narratives in the constitution of identity 
highlighted that stories guide action, that people construct identities by locating 
themselves or being located within a repertoire of emplotted stories.69 According to 
Bernardi et al. ‘narratives marshal a range of common story elements that draw 
upon their readers’ historical experiences to facilitate diverse interpretation. This is 




63 Stuart Hall quoted in Bernardi et al. Narrative Landmines, p.22. 
64 Stuart Hall quoted in Bernardi et al. Narrative Landmines, p.22. 
65 Daniel L. Bernardi et al. Narrative Landmines, 23. 
66 Ruth A. Wallace and Alison Wolf Contemporary Sociological Theory, (New Jersey: Pearson, 2006) 
p.199. 
67 George Ritzer Sociological Theory, p.337. 
68 Ruth A. Wallace and Alison Wolf Contemporary Sociological Theory, p.222. 
69 Margaret Somers “The Narrative Constitution of Identity”, p.614. 
70 Daniel L. Bernardi et al. Narrative Landmines, p.24. 
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Transportation into the Narrative World 
Fischer proposed that narratives consist of ‘symbolic actions – words and/or deeds – 
that have sequence and meaning for those who live, create or interpret them’.71 For 
Fischer, narratives are not created or understood in isolation – their meaning is 
derived from the experiences of those who interact with them. This he referred to as 
“transportation into the narrative world” which fundamentally involves the self, and 
he believed may even change the self.72 Green’s research proposes that ‘the 
phenomenological experience of becoming absorbed into a story, or transported 
into a narrative world, is the key mechanism underlying the influence of stories or 
narratives on individual’s beliefs’.73  
 
Busselle and Bilandzic argue that message recipients construct character models, 
story world models, and situation models to make sense of the events in the 
narrative. 74 They go on further to suggest that for an individual to comprehend a 
narrative message they must ‘shift their focus from the actual world into the fictional 
world and situate themselves within the mental models they construct for the 
story’.75 Green further contends that a transported individual is ‘fully mentally 
engaged with the story, responds emotionally to it, and may experience vivid mental 
images of story events’.76 This full engagement is suggested to affect individuals by 
relaxing the boundaries of the self, identifying with the characters and sympathising 
with them and characters and narrative events can provide blueprints for possible 
selves.77 Such assertions are crucial to this thesis. The process of transportation – 
whereby individuals are carried away imaginatively into the narrative’s world – 
 
71 Walter R. Fisher, Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value and 
Action (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1987) p.24. 
72 Walter R. Fisher, Human Communication as Narration, p.25. 
73 Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock “The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public 
Narratives” pp.401-421; Melanie C Green and Timothy C. Brock “In the Mind’s Eye”, in Melanie C. 
Green et.al. pp.315-341.  
74 Rick Busselle and Helena Bilandzic, “Measuring Narrative Engagement” Media Psychology, 12, 
(2009), pp.321-347.  
75 Rick Busselle and Helena Bilandzic, “Fictionality and Perceived Realism in Experiencing Stories: A 
Model of Narrative Comprehension and Engagement, Communication Theory, 18, (2008), pp.255-280, 
p.272. 
76 Melanie C. Green and Timothy C. Brock “In the Mind’s Eye”, p.318. 
77 Abraham Tesser, Joanne V. Wood and Diederik A. Stapel (Eds) On Building, Defending, and 
Regulating the Self: A Psychological Perspective (New York: Psychology Press), p.71 
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appears to distinguish the processing of narrative from non-narrative 
communication.78 
 
Green argued that psychological transportation, described as the ‘process whereby 
all mental systems and capacities are focused on events in a narrative’ can render 
that narrative more persuasive by circumventing traditional barriers to belief and 
attitude change. 79  And furthermore, Green suggests, this psychological 
transportation reduces counter-arguing against a persuasive message as message 
recipients are subsumed or caught up in the narrative and are not sufficiently 
motivated to critically evaluate the persuasive arguments contained therein.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated the component parts of a narrative and how they differ 
from a story. The prominent feature that will be captured in further chapters is how 
narratives are often less about truth and facts and more concerned about coherence 
and something that will be robust and convincing as it is reproduced. The preceding 
analysis highlighted how important a narrative can be in transportation somebody 
into the world in which the narrative is framed and how this can blur the lines 
between reality and the fictional world. The existing literature on narrative potency 
was exposed with the weight of the argument seeming to favour the position that 
narratives can have a significant role to play. The common components of narratives 
of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq can be surmised as humanitarian, ideological and 







78 Melanie C. Green and Timothy Brock “The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public 
Narratives”, pp.401-421. 
79 Melanie C. Green, Timothy C. Brock, and Geoff F. Kaufman, ‘Understanding Media Enjoyment: The 
Role of Transportation into Narrative Worlds,’ Communication Theory, 14:4 (2004), pp. 311–327. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Radicalisation and the Role of Social Media 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation argues that narratives are motivation for British Muslims to adopt a 
Salafist-Jihadist ideology and travel to Syria/Iraq where they engage in terrorist 
offences. Extrapolating on this argument requires a critical review of radicalisation, 
as the preceding chapter has highlighted the importance of narratives and their 
contribution to an individual becoming a foreign fighter, it is therefore imperative 
that this is examined within the broader conceptual framework of radicalisation. The 
examination of radicalisation will reveal the components that constituent the 
specific narratives of Salafist-Jihadist British fighters and the interrelated and 
appealing storylines which are part of the process. The increase in emphasis on 
radicalisation in news outlets and social media, who often use the terms “radical”, 
“radicalise” or “radicalisation” in a variety of ways without clarifying what is precisely 
meant, has turned the term into an all-encompassing concept assumed to reflect 
“how someone becomes bad”.  
 
In attempting to understand the motivations to enter a conflict zone outside of one’s 
own country, conducting a critical analysis of radicalisation will assist this process. In 
conducting this review, it is not the intention to designate one particular model of 
radicalisation as superior to the others, nor is it to propose an entirely new model. 
Instead this chapter will begin with outlining the historical background to this 
relatively new concept and extrapolating on the existing body of research, outline 
three factors which are assessed as contributing to the radicalisation of individuals. It 
will be argued that social group dynamics coupled with identity are compounded by 
relative deprivation to contribute to the foreign fighter phenomenon, and the 
chapter will conclude with identifying how the internet and in particular social media 
facilitated the communication and dissemination of radicalisation. This chapter will 
not address the process of radicalisation per se, rather it will critically analyse 
existing research on radicalisation of foreign fighters and extract the pertinent issues 
for further examination. 
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Historical Underpinnings 
Radicalisation is broadly accepted as a post-9/11 product and before then, most 
analyses were purely terrorism focused. For example, the most influential pre-9/11 
academic study of the causes of terrorism is Martha Crenshaw’s 1981 paper “the 
causes of terrorism”. Her paper does not specifically focus on radicalisation, but 
reviewing it in today’s context one can see the correlation between the root causes 
of terrorism and radicalisation through her defined factor of individual motivation 
and belief systems. While there is a diverse and multitudinous quantity of literature 
on radicalisation, the failure of the academic community to develop a consensus 
definition of the phenomenon is a significant obstacle. Many of the academic works 
are beset by limitations due to them not being empirically informed, or having 
strong methodological underpinnings.80 What is called radicalisation in one discipline 
is often described as extremism or terrorism in another. Radicalisation according to 
Schmid  
is not just a socio-psychological scientific concept but also a political construct, 
introduced into the public and academic debate mainly by national security 
establishments faced with political Islam in general and Salafist Jihadism in particular.81 
 
Cognisant of the contestations and challenges associated with definitions of 
radicalisation, this section will instead focus primarily on the process as an 
exposition of the variety of radicalisation definitions is beyond the ambit of this 
particular review. However, in order to proceed a number of definitional distinctions 
need to be clarified from the outset. I will adopt as a working definition of 
radicalisation that of McCauley and Moskalenko’s, who contend that radicalisation is 
the development of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of any group or cause in 
 
80 Alex P. Schmid “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion 
and Literature Review” (The Hague: ICCT Research Paper, 2013); Randy Borum “Radicalisation into 
Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research” Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 4:4 (2011) pp.37-62; Andrew Silke “Research on Terrorism: A Review of the Impact of 9/11 
and the Global War on Terrorism” in. Hsinchun Chen, Edna Reid, Joshua Sinai, Andrew Silke and Boaz 
Ganor (Eds.) Terrorism Informatics: Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security 
(New York: Springer, 2008) pp.27-50. 
81 Alex P. Schmid “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation, p.19. 
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conflict.82 They expand further to state that an extreme of radicalisation is terrorism, 
in which a non-state group targets not only government forces but civilian citizens 
supporting the government.83  However it has a problematic relationship with 
radicalism, seen as the expression of legitimate political thought, which is still 
reflected in the titles of some political parties in Europe, and consequently can 
contribute to confusion. Radicalism as advocacy of, and commitment to, sweeping 
change and restructuring of political and social institutions has historically been 
associated with left- and right-wing political parties for example.84 McCauley and 
Moskalenko’s explanation of the radicalisation process is comprehensive and 
importantly, distinguishes and disentangles the movement of individuals and groups 
to legal and nonviolent political action (activism) or to illegal and violent political 
action (radicalism).85 
 
The Spectrum of Radicalisation 
While consensus may be difficult to find on the mechanisms and pathways towards 
radicalism, it would be remiss not to make reference to the notion that radicalisation 
leads to terrorism is fiercely contested in academic circles. According to John Horgan  
the idea that radicalisation causes terrorism is perhaps the biggest myth alive today in 
terrorism…[first], the overwhelming majority of people who hold radical beliefs do not 
engage in violence. And second, there is increasing evidence that people who engage in 
terrorism don’t necessarily hold radical beliefs.86 
 
This assertion by Horgan is widely accepted in academic circles and there is plenty of 
 
82 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko Friction: How Radicalisation Happens to Them and Us 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) p.4. 
83 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko “Mechanisms of Political Radicalisation: Pathways Toward 
Terrorism” Terrorism and Political Violence, 20:3, (2008), pp.415-433. 
84 Akil N. Awan, Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin Radicalisation and Media: Connectivity and 
Terrorism in the New Media Ecology (London: Routledge, 2012) p.3. 
85 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko “Individual and Group Mechanisms of Radicalization” in L. 
Fenstermacher, L. Kuznar, T. Rieger & A. Speckhard(ed), Topical Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment 
(SMA) Multi-Agency and Air Force Research Laboratory Multi-Disciplinary White Papers in Support of 
Counter-Terrorism and Counter-WMD: Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic 
Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspective on Root Causes, The Role of Ideology, and 
Programs for Counter-Radicalization and Disengagement (2010) pp.82-92. 
86 John Knefel “Everything You’ve Been Told About Radicalisation is Wrong” Rolling Stone available at 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/everything-youve-been-told-about-
radicalization-is-wrong-80445/ (last accessed 6 May 2015). 
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evidence to support the thesis that not all (social) movements become radicalised or 
violent like ISIS.  
 
One way to attempt to understand a person’s pathway to joining a foreign fight is to 
use Tomas Precht’s three-part motivational framework, developed to identify the 
factors influencing the radicalisation process of militant Islamists in Europe. The 
framework comprises three categories of influential factors. The first is “background 
factors,” which includes personal struggles with identity (including religious identity), 
experiences with discrimination or injustice, needs for belonging, and lack of social 
integration. The second category Precht calls “trigger factors,” and include people 
(such as a mentor or charismatic leader) and events (such as military or policy 
actions) that might provoke or incite either antipathy or activism. The third category 
is that of “opportunity factors,” which account for an individual’s degree of access 
and likelihood of exposure to the grievances behind the local conflict or people 
involved in that struggle within her or his sphere of activity. These include physical 
and virtual spaces such as the internet, religious institutions, and penal institutions.87 
 
An empirical analysis conducted by Rand and Vasseko, based on social media, 
examined the reasons posted by people who traveled beyond their home borders to 
fight in Syria and Iraq which provide insight into the radicalisation process. Four 
prominent motivational themes emerged. First, they identified a belief that the fight 
to establish a Caliphate in the Levant and Iraq is part of a transnational larger 
struggle by Sunni Muslims against both the West and Shi’a Islam. Secondly, there is a 
belief that the fight in Syria is a defensive struggle by the Ummah against the corrupt 
and apostate Assad regime. Thirdly, there was a feeling of outrage at the 
humanitarian crises created and atrocities perpetrated by the regime and a 
perception that the West has failed to respond to the tragedy in Syria. Finally, people 
identified a desire to take part in what might be thought of as a form of adventure 
tourism.88 Testifying to the US Senate in March 2010 Scott Atran stated that: 
 
87 Tomas Precht, Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization in Europe: From Conversion to 
Terrorism (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Defense, 2007). 
88 Dafna Rand and Anthony Vassalo, “Bringing the Fight Back Home: Western Foreign Fighters in Iraq 
and Syria,” Center for a New American Security (2014), p. 2-3. 
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Entry into the jihadi brotherhood is from the bottom up: from alienated and 
marginalized youth seeking out companionship, esteem, and meaning, but also the 
thrill of action, sense of empowerment, and glory in fighting the world’s most powerful 
nation and army…Popular jihadi internet Imams, like Anwar al-Awalaki, are not 
important because they brainwash, command or even guide others to actions and 
targets. Rather, popular radical Imams serve as “attractors” whose message and 
presence draws into line a searching soul who has already pretty much chosen his own 
path.89 
 
The concept of identity will be dealt with as a standalone chapter but the reasons of 
relative deprivation, social group dynamics and adventurism are worthy of brief 
mention. 
 
Grievance and Relative Deprivation 
In their article that attempts to consolidate theorising about the radicalisation of 
Western home-grown Jihadists, Michael King and Donald Taylor review what they 
describe as “five major models” of radicalisation.90 In doing so they identify two 
commonalities that recur in the five reviewed models and other existing research 
that they preclude from their present discussion, they are relative deprivation and 
an identity crisis. According to them, individuals experience feelings of relative 
deprivation ‘by comparing their material conditions to that of other groups, and 
viewing their group’s disadvantage as an injustice’.91 Both Assaf Moghaddam and 
Randy Borum’s models of radicalisation place relative deprivation at the initial stages 
of the process. Engaging in terrorist activity is often cited as being a consequence of 
structural or individual alienation. Rik Coolsaet’s study of the Jihadist scene in 
Belgium, cited the root causes of radicalisation to be mostly structural, ‘high 
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Social Group Dynamics 
Byman and Shapiro’s research on foreign fighters note that the decision to join a 
conflict is usually ‘less an act of religious commitment than of young male rebellion 
and thirst for adventure’.93 This finding is complimented by Donatella della Porta 
whose research (the majority of which focussed on left-wing terrorist groups) 
concluded that joining a violent group for thrill, money, or status does not require 
any political ideas or ideology.94   
Wilson and Daly whose research examines the propensity for risk-taking and 
violence among young men have found that the thrill of operations that involve guns 
and money; and status and fame is unparalleled by the achievement of an ordinary 
life. Young men, in particular they argue, are susceptible to the appeal of these 
rewards as they transition from adolescence into young adulthood, trying to position 
themselves relative to their peers.95 For these individuals, they contend, the ideology 
of the group they join matters less than the anticipation of thrill and status.96  
An influential model of radicalisation has been the one of Quintan Wiktorowicz who, 
in 2005, introduced the notion of a “cognitive opening” as the moment when an 
individual who has perhaps been trying to make sense of his or her existence and 
‘suddenly sees the light’, exchanging an old view of the world for one considered 
more true.97  Put simply, as Wiktorowicz states, people ‘rarely awake with a sudden 
taste for radicalism or an epiphany that drives them to support violence’.98 Recalling 
the research by Dina al Raffie referred to in the previous section, she asserts that 
individuals becoming radicalised into a Salafist-Jihadist mindset involves creating the 
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identity of a person which is based on a ‘puritanical interpretation of Islam that 
imbues the individual with a sense of moral and spiritual superiority, setting him/her 
aside from the rest of society’. Therefore, this cognitive opening Wiktorowicz refers 
to is correlated and not mutually exclusive from this process of identity formation. 
 
Summary 
The radicalisation of individuals is a messy human affair, which cannot be attributed 
to one factor, but existing research has demonstrated there exists a number of 
contributing elements. Notwithstanding this, the majority are perceived as structural 
and bearing in mind the previous chapter, to suggest that individuals have no agency 
is to neglect a legitimate body of evidence that suggests this. Therefore, the 
prominence of identity in the debate resulted in it becoming a chapter of its own in 
this project.  It is also evident from the research examined that a number of the 
issues which are cited as being triggers are global or transnational, such as the 
oppression of the West and the corrupt nature of certain Arab or Gulf regimes. For 
such events to be motivating I would argue that this information would be 
disseminated from certain sources through a persuasive or narrative context such as 
ISIS or al Qaeda. The means through which this propaganda can reach its intended 
audience is the subject of the second part of this chapter.  
 
Terrorist Use of the Internet 
Over the last 15-20 years, the radicalisation process has had an important online 
element. Indeed the permeation of internet communications into everyday lives has 
had a profound impact on every section of society. According to data from the Office 
for National Statistics in 2017, almost all adults (99%) aged 16 to 34 years were 
frequent internet users. While identifying the specific platforms and applications 
they use wasn’t in scope of the afore-mentioned survey, it can be assumed that 
social media and social networking sites are particularly popular with this age 
bracket.99 Notwithstanding the fact that there have been an unquantifiable number 
of positives outcomes from the dispersion of internet communications, there have 
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been negative unintended consequences too, as it has and continues to be utilised 
by nefarious actors. 
 
There is a significant body of literature which holds that the internet has many 
benefits for international terrorists.100  Though not exhaustive perhaps one of the 
most concise reviews is that of Maura Conway who noted that terrorists use the 
internet for reasons including information provision; financing; networking; 
recruitment and; information gathering.101 Writing in 2006 Conway’s analysis is as 
relevant today in spite of the developments in the international terrorism arena and 
simultaneously in internet-based communications. And arguably the arena that has 
been most utilised for terrorist actors is that of social media, after spending in excess 
of 15 years lurking in password-protected forums.  
 
Social Media 
Social media’s effect on changing communications has become ubiquitous with the 
Arab Spring, but notably, the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, the 2009 Iran election 
protests, the 2013 Boston Bombing (and subsequent manhunt) and 2014 Westgate 
Mall attack, were events in which social media played a significant role in 
communication. The 2014 ICSR report “#Greenbirds” revealed a lot about the power 
of social media in the Syrian civil war. Using open-source information tools the 
researchers analysed their interests by looking at Facebook “likes” and Twitter 
“retweets” and mentions.102 Their research has important implications for this study 
as it revealed how for those in Syria, how social media came to represent both an 
essential source of information and inspiration as they documented their activities 
and collective engagement in conflict in real time.103  Writing in 2013, Prucha and 
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Fisher comment that the shift toward social media use for new generation Jihadists 
‘reflects to a great extent a specific zeitgeist, a contemporary as well as generational 
shift from texts and scripts to a “visual literacy”’.104 
 
Social media is a prime medium for which to engage in self-presentation practices 
and behind the cover of a keyboard one can re-create their identity. In analysing the 
inter-connectedness of social media from a social movement and contemporary 
activism perspective, Paulo Gerbaudo asserts that the connections created with 
distant others ‘run the risk of taking energy and time away from interactions based 
on physical proximity…this tendency of new media to engender dynamics of 
seclusion from local communities and the thickness of face-to-face networks is an 
aspect overlooked’. 105  This physical isolation but social interconnectedness 
phenomenon associated with social media is astutely noted by Sherry Turkle who 
surmises:  
 
alone with your thoughts, yet in contact with an almost intangible fantasy of the other, 
you feel free to play. At the screen you have a chance to write yourself into the person 
you want to be and to imagine others as you wish them to be, constructing them for 
your purposes. It is a seductive but dangerous habit of mind.106 
 
This leads to the question just what is social about social media? Answering the 
rhetorical question, Christian Fuchs asserts that the answer lies in human agency.107 
The internet he defines ‘…is a techno-social system that comprises the social 
processes of cognition, communication and co-operation.108 So while establishing 
that social media engages a person in the social aspect of communication, to what 
extent it becomes a substitute for physical interactions and communities is worthy of 
some discussion. Interaction thus plays an especially strong role in identity 
construction in a conversational medium such as Twitter, as followers will primarily 
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draw conclusions based on the contents of tweet messages as well as indications of 
the intended recipients of those messages.109 
 
Social Media as a Virtual Community 
Kotkin states that ‘by abolishing the need for face-to-face contact, the internet 
increases loneliness and social isolation, expanding virtual networks that lack the 
intimacy of real relationships nurtured by physical proximity’.110 Rheingold posed the 
thesis that the popularity of online communities was ‘a response to the hunger for 
community that has followed the disintegration of traditional communities’.111 
Michael R. Parks in his research assessed the status of online settings such as 
MySpace and Facebook as sites of virtual communities, seeking in particular to 
determine what conditions are necessary for the formation of communities.112 He 
acknowledges the academic debate which pertains to defining what consuitutes a 
community, and highlights the more recent views of it as a ‘culture, set of ideas and 
interpersonal sentiments tather than as a physical place’.113 As a result of his study 
of MySpace, Parks concluded that  
 
…a group might qualify as a virtual community if its members engaged in collective 
action, shared in rituals, had a variety of relational linkages, and were emotionally 
bonded to others in a way that conferred a sense of belonging and group 
identification.114 
 
Twitter – A Jihadi hub? 
According to Barrett, Facebook is the dominant social medium in the Levant, while 
Twitter rules in the Gulf. ISIS posts in multiple languages to extend its reach unlike its 
competitor al Qaeda who tend to use Arabic on Twitter and Facebook.115 The 
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importance given by Jihadist groups to Twitter was for example highlighted in the 
11th issue of Inspire magazine released by AQAP (Yemen) in May 2013.116 The 
Jihadist insurgents in Syria and Iraq use all manner of social media applications and 
file sharing platforms, most prominently Ask.fm, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, 
PalTalk, kik, Viber, Telegram and Tumblr, ‘but circumstances conspire to make 
Twitter the most popular application’.117 
 
Twitter has simple yet powerful methods of connecting tweets to larger themes, 
specific people and groups that is a unique aspect of the medium. Specifically, 
tweets can be categorised by a “hashtag”. Any word(s) preceded by a hashtag sign 
“#” are used in Twitter to note a subject, event, or association. Hashtags are an 
integral part of Twitter’s ability to link the conversations of strangers together. The 
structure of communication via hashtags facilitates impromptu and rapid 
interactions of individuals (often strangers) into these conversations.118 Unlike on 
most online social networking sites, such as Facebook or MySpace, on Twitter the 
relationship of following and being followed requires no reciprocation. A user can 
follow any other user, and the user being followed need not follow back.119 Twitter 
assisted the activists of Syria to organise themselves and their demonstrations in 
March 2011 particularly when they created the hashtag “#march15” to associate 
with their so-called “day of rage”.120 The fact that users are assessed to be seeking 
more and more encryption and privacy, it is somewhat contrary that many Twitter 
users fighting with extremist groups such as ISIS appear more than content 
proselytising and utilising imagery to convey their message in an open and 
uninhibited fashion.121 
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 Twitter and ISIS 
ISIS’s sophistication with social media goes beyond mere usage. The group actively 
employs strategies to distort its online presence, make it appear more formidable, 
and drown out competing messages. One such technique is organised hashtag 
campaigns ‘in which the group enlists hundreds and sometimes thousands of 
activists to repetitively tweet hashtags at certain times of day so that they trend on 
the social network’. 122  This approach has been successful, for example, in 
outperforming hashtags associated with al-Nusra Front, even though the groups 
have similar numbers of online supporters.123 
 
ISIS made extensive use of Twitter according to US officials, operatives and 
supporters of the organisation produced up to 90,000 tweets every day. On Twitter, 
ISIS began using “official” propaganda accounts around August 2013124 however, 
since the summer of 2014, as account suspensions crippled ISIS’s networks, its social 
media strategy shifted from broadcasting information from accounts to utilising 
dedicated hashtags.125 This, according to Charlie Winter, ‘occurred out of necessity, 
rather than choice. Officially branded accounts made for easy targets for those with 
the power to suspend…’.126  
 
A study’s results published in 2015 found that ISIS supporters operated at least 
46,000 independent Twitter accounts, with 200-500 of these accounts active all day, 
thereby helping to disseminate the organisation’s propaganda.127 In addition, the 
organisation developed an application for mobile devices called ‘Dawn of Glad 
Tidings’, which for a period of time was available for download in Google and Apple 
app stores and enabled its supporters to follow the organisation’s activities in real 
time. Somewhat insidiously and equally cleverly, in downloading the application to 
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one’s device, it allowed ISIS to take temporary control of the Twitter account of the 
said user and publish messages in his/her name. 128 
 
Twitter and Imagery 
Aryn Baker has commented on ISIS’s use of images and on the dangerous symbiotic 
relationship at play by stating that ‘the ubiquity of camera phones and social media 
are enabling a mixture of propaganda, intimidation and boastful exhibitionism’.129 
Indeed research on imagery in media generally has indicated that humans process 
images more quickly than text, making images more emotionally visceral and 
responses to images frequently more immediate and powerful than responses to 
text.130 Recalling Baker’s statement, studies have documented that viewers react to 
disturbing images by becoming more fearful or anxious, by amplifying their 
perceptions of risk, and by adopting revised assessments of the consequences of 
what the image depicts.131  
 
The basis for the visual image, vision itself, is biological and is therefore universal 
across cultures.132  Veteran political media expert Doris Graber compliments this 
assertion by stating that images not only attract the attention of viewers, but they 
also expand the audience base for the messages of media campaigns.133  Berger’s 
research compliments this by finding that ISIS ‘has been able to exert an outsized 
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impact on how the world perceives it, by disseminating images of graphic 
violence…’.134 The Soufan Group have highlighted how the social media of foreign 
fighters in which ‘the image portrayed is welcoming and reassuring and address the 
fear of the unfamiliar, for example there are many postings of fighters with pet 
kittens’.135 
 
McLuhan and Fiore contend that ‘viewers focus on visual information because they 
see images as credible records, allowing them to “witness” news events even though 
they themselves were not physcially present’.136 The theory of narratives highlighted 
previously detailed how they can have a transporting effect, and Twitter’s ability to 
convey imagery makes this a potent combination for consumers.  
Concluding Remarks 
The reason for undertaking a review of radicalisation in this thesis was to briefly 
explain some of the factors that are said to contribute to a person leaving their own 
country to take up violent actions in another.  The range of push and pull factors 
identified can be summarised as solidarity with other fellow Muslims abroad, 
alienation and social exclusion felt in Europe, and the search for excitement and 
adventure.137 In every factor and every phase identified, online communications has 
had the potential to play an important role. Social media in particular provided a 
vehicle to convey a message to the masses that was previously unseen. The 
platforms facilitated short impactful statements to be communicated to an 
unquantifiable audience and also allowed imagery to be transmitted which as 
demonstrated in the preceding analysis can be more affective than words in certain 
circumstances. As previously demonstrated, research suggests that a narrative can 
have the effect of transporting the reader into the world from which it has 
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constructed.  Given the potency of imagery to a reader, this combination is deemed 























CHAPTER 3 - Ideology 
 
Introduction 
A fundamental question of this thesis is why young British Muslims, in an albeit small 
number of cases, travel for extremist purposes to Syria. While there is obviously no 
“one size fits all” explanation, there exists some common indicators. For a young 
(predominantly male) British Muslim to find their way to a battlefield in Raqqa or 
Mosul, a series of events must occur in what can be compared to a Swiss cheese 
model, in that all the holes must line up, and the irregularity of that represents the 
very rare instances of this happening as a percentage of the total community. It will 
be necessary in this chapter to examine the debate on whether or not religious 
ideology plays a key role in this journey. Subsequent chapters will then flesh out my 
empirical argument that Salafist-Jihadist ideology is extremely potent and when 
channelled through a narrative context, can have a persuasive effect.    
 
This chapter proposes to tackle questions such as why medieval interpretations of a 
religious ideology still hold sway in some quarters today? How can they appeal to 
some people living in modern, liberal, western democratic societies such as Britain? I 
will commence with a brief examination of the concept of Salafism, the relationship 
with Wahhabism and will follow with a detailed analysis of the Salafist-Jihadist 
ideology, seeking to provide clarity on a subject where poorly defined terms have 
often plagued its study. It will be demonstrated that ideology is an important 
contributor to Salafi-Jihadist terrorism, though there are competing views on this. 
Finally I will conclude by examining how some British Muslims expound the Salafist-
Jihadist ideology in their support for groups such as ISIS in Syria and Iraq.  
 
Brief Context 
Hall described ideology as ‘the framework for thinking and calculations about the 
world—the “ideas” that people use to figure out how the social world works, what 
their place is in it, and what they ought to do’.138 It is contended that a terrorist 
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group’s ideology is a set of ideas that the members adhere to and it is indoctrinated 
in its members in order to guide their activities and actions, while a narrative is a 
vehicle through which this ideology can be communicated. The concept of religiously 
motivated terrorism is relatively new, the study of which was pioneered by Bruce 
Hoffman but is foremost in academic research today.139 But there exists significant 
difference in opinions on the role which ideology has played in mobilising people to 
conduct terrorist related activity.  
 
The Salafi movement is a very diversified, complicated ideologically and religiously 
motivated trend and is thus not categorised by one unified discourse or group or 
authority for that matter.140 For example a common statement often heard is that as 
a rule, all Wahhabis are Salafis, but not all Salafis are Wahhabis, which I will tease 
out in this chapter. Islamism is also another complex trend that includes a spectrum 
from moderate to radical movements, but it is not equivalent to Wahhabism: it is 
actually its antithesis. While Islamism, Wahhabism and Salafism share a few 
theological and intellectual doctrines, they are very different.141 The proceeding 
paragraphs will lay the theological and ideological foundations for further discussion.  
 
Political Islam, Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood 
The existence of Islam for almost 1,500 years demonstrates that the phenomenon 
today referred to as Islamism is a relatively recent addition. Peter Neumann surmises 
that the advent of political Islam and Islamism can be attributed to when Islam 
encountered modernity, particularly the west, as a consequence of the colonial era 
when the Islamic world’s proud tradition of empires and caliphs was suppressed by 
large parts of the Muslim world being ruled by the West.142 According to him ‘for 
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many Muslims, especially in the Arab world, the colonial era was a hard and 
humiliating experience that threw up many questions about their own identity’.143 
 
This changed in the first half of the twentieth century with the emergence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which is arguably the most significant Muslim organisation in 
the world. The movement was founded in Egypt in 1928 by scholar Hasan al-Banna, 
at a time when British rule was most palpable and emerged in response to what it 
perceived as the rise of Western imperialism and the associated decline of Islam in 
public life, trends it sought to reverse via grassroots Islamic activism (dar al-
dawa).144 The group’s mission was dedicated not just to ending colonialism, but to 
obtain control of the state and consequentially abolish the secular judicial system 
and introduce Sharia law.145 The Brotherhood’s exclusively Sunni membership does 
not make it callously hostile to other Islamic sects, such as Shi’ism, or Sufism, and it 
has never been as doctrinally rigorous as present-day Salafi-Jihadists.  
 
Following a failed assassination attempt on the President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the 
Brotherhood was outlawed in January 1954 in a series of measures aimed to 
crackdown on Egypt’s Islamists. It was during this period of repression that the 
movement’s leader Sayyid Qutb spent 10 years in prison, penning his most 
influential book Milestones Along the Way during his incarceration.146 Qutb argued 
that society had regressed to a state of ignorance associated with pre-Islamic times, 
a period known as jahiliyya.147 By framing society in this way pan-Islamic ideologies 
offer a new sense of politically significant collective identity and created a form of 
nationalism. Qutb ‘fundamentally recalibrated the way Islamists understood their 
relationship with the state’.148 As society was in need of a complete overhaul radical 
ideas now became mainstreamed to combat and confront the state and however 
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spiritually focused the Brotherhood’s activities initially were, as they mutated they 
resulted in conflict.149 
 
The followers of Qutb, persecuted by Nasser, found sanctuary in Saudi Arabia, where 
Qutb’s ideas and the locally predominant religious doctrine cross-pollinated each 
other in the following years.150 Saudi Wahhabism is ‘a particularly harsh form of 
Salafism’ and the nature with which Wahhabism became popular in the eighteenth 
century (predominantly through punitive action and coercion) is indicative of how 
many of its followers conduct their affairs in the present day. Jihadism – and 
specifically Salafi-Jihadism – is a combination of Qutb’s violent theory of revolution 
and Wahhabist religious doctrine.151 The Brotherhood championed the restoration 
of the caliphate as the ideal system of government for the Islamic world, a popular 
theme in the earlier 20th century. The Saudi state’s sponsorship of Salafism, 
particularly since they inherited their hydrocarbon wealth is a force-multiplier and 
attributable to the success of the permeation of the ideology abroad, particularly in 
Europe and the Balkan States. 
 
Salafism (al-salafiyya): from “al-salaf al-salih” the pious predecessors 
Salafism is commonly correlated with terrorism in the twenty-first century which is 
not only erroneous but deeply offensive to the majority of those Salafists who simply 
seek to live the most authentic life as a Muslim similar to those who were living with 
the Prophet or within living memory of him. Salafist Islam attempts to return to the 
Islam practiced by the Prophet, his companions, and the first generations of 
Muslims. Salafists range from ‘liberal-progressives to conservative-reactionaries in 
three strands of Salafism: quietest; political Salafists and Salafist-Jihadists’, and it 
should be noted that the majority of Salafis are quietist.152  
 
The sources of Salafi ideology are the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and the Hadith. Because 
of the ambiguity involved in translating Qur’anic verses into practice, particularly in 
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new contexts in the modern world, the Hadith have become critical in providing 
guidance. Salafi scholars must examine the life of the Prophet to extract model 
actions that transcend time and then apply these examples to the modern context. 
This is important to note, and while not uncommon in other religions, the fact that 
the Salafi ideology is largely conveyed through an interpretation of the Prophet’s 
sayings introduces a degree of poetic license. This therefore lends itself perfect to 
enveloping in the communicative framework of narratives. There is much scope for 
personal interpretation around the central question of Salfi ideology, which can be 
summed up in the simple question ‘what would the Prophet do if he were alive 
today?’153  
 
Salafism disregards the centuries of innovation and development that took place in 
the middle ages and the early modern period. That position raises the fundamental 
issue of determining how Islam was practiced in the first generations, and how this 
can be reconciled with twenty-first century modernity.154 The answer, in addition to 
the aforementioned matter of religious certainty, can be found in Salafism's 
promotion of a specific Muslim identity, which is infused with claims to authenticity 
and therefore followers are afforded a unique degree of doctrinal purity and 
legitimacy. 155  This self-proclaimed authenticity is encapsulated in a “muscular 
discourse” that is directed at reforming other, non-Salafi, Muslims, and which 
amounts to an activist worldview in which one sees oneself as pure and the other as 
in need of purification in both belief and practice.156 There exists in this movement 
what some have labeled as a “hostile othering” of non-Salafi Muslims and the 
creation of “in-group” and “out-group” boundaries or membership.157 The Salafi-
Jihadi movement, is credited as viewing the world as being divided between loyalty 
and disavowal; truth and falsehood; faith and disbelief, and this binary position 
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provides very rich data points from which to anchor studies.158 This concept of the 
in-group and out-group will be addressed in more detail below.  
 
In the later decades of the twentieth century the Arab Middle East saw the rise of 
violent Jihadist groups influenced by both Muslim Brotherhood activism and Salafi 
exclusivism. These groups were the forerunners of today’s Salafi-Jihadi groups. 
Wiktorowicz succinctly describes the different approaches to Jihad that exist 
amongst Salafis stating that  
‘the [Salafi-] jihadi faction believes that violence can be used to establish Islamic states 
and confront the United States and its allies. Nonviolent Salafis, on the other hand, 
emphatically reject the use of violence and instead emphasize propagation and advice 
(usually private) to incumbent rulers in the Muslim world’.159 
 
Salafi-Jihadist Ideology in Detail  
Researchers have identified the key ideas of Salafi-Jihadism central of which are 
takfir and tawhid.160 While these ideas exist in Islam, what is interesting is how the 
Salafi-Jihadi movement manipulate the interpretation of these concepts, in a process 
referred to as ‘significant ideational mutation that credits the adherents with 
religious validation and endorsement’.161 For the Salafi-Jihad movement takfir has 
become a valuable tool for the protection of Islam, a means of expelling those from 
the faith who are thought to be subverting it from within. Its importance as a 
concept to the contemporary Salafi-Jihadi movement stems from the principle 
purpose of takfir: defining precisely what the Muslim community is and who its 
constituents are, the in-group and out-group.162 It concerns itself with the question 
of who is a Muslim and a natural consequence is that it also preoccupies itself with 
the conceptualisation of who is a disbeliever, or kafir.163 By doing so it explicitly 
delineates the boundaries of faith, creating the in-group of rightful adherents while 
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also identifying an out-group of heretics.164  The doctrine has been extremely 
effective in fuelling intra-Muslim tensions, violence and sectarianism. 
 
A central pillar of Islam, trying to realise the tawhid of God is the central goal of 
every Muslim’s life with Salafis tending to prioritise its fulfilment more than others. It 
is described by Wiktorowicz as the ‘crux’ of their faith.165 While Muslims proclaim 
that ‘there is no agent but Allah, there is no object of worth besides Allah, and there 
is no reality but Allah’, Salafi-Jihadis pursue the principle of tawhid with a rigidity 
that is both compelling and chilling.166 Historically, Abdullah Azzam’s declaration that 
only those who fought jihad could truly appreciate the full dimensions of tawhid, 
was a bold idea, suggesting that any Muslim who refrained from participating in 
jihad in its militant terms, was suffering from deficiencies in their faith and 
neglecting their duty.167 This introduced a sense of obligation and runs parallel with 
the fundamental facet of narrative communication that a resolution or course of 
action is presented to the reader.  
 
According to Ayman al-Zawahiri post 9/11, ‘only a renewal of tawhid’ could save 
Muslims from ‘living on the margins of the New World Order’.168 This linked the idea 
of tawhid to a broader system of revolutionary change, which involves the 
implementation of Shari’a, a political authority for Islam, and end to occupation of 
dar al-Harb. Belief and adherence to the concept of tawhid is represented in many 
images of foreign fighters and is often accompanied by illustrations of violence or 
weaponry on display.  
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In the context of Islam as a living ideal, faith alone is a necessary but insufficient 
condition of both belief and membership and must be coupled with action and vice 
versa.169 In the Salafi-Jihadi strand this action often extends beyond the five pillars 
and encompasses violent means. But the conditions must exist for potential violence 
to be actualised. The idea of a non-state and irregular force of volunteers marching 
off to become mujahideen gained popular traction in the modern era during the 
Afghan-Soviet war in the 1980s, which was fuelled by the ideas of Abdullah 
Azzam.170 This refocusing of priorities has been described as a decision to confront 
the “far enemy”. This was compounded by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which fuelled a 
sense of duty for those who were adherents or even sympathetic to the doctrine of a 
“global Jihad.171 Cole Bunzel’s paper for Brookings on the ideology of the Islamic 
State identifies within the group’s texts and speeches a number of emphasised 
doctrinal concepts. The most prominent of these stipulate: all Muslims must 
associate exclusively with fellow “true” Muslims and disassociate from anyone not 
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fitting this narrow definition.172 Research has demonstrated that the propaganda of 
Jihadists ‘reduces complex phenomena to simple clichés, creating dichotomies of 
black and white, “us” versus “them”, good and evil, often linked to incitements to 
disapprove of an opponent or hate an enemy’.173  
 
British Salafist (-Jihadist) Brand 
According to Sadek Hamid, British Muslim communities comprise a diverse range of 
traditions, with the majority of their corresponding theological and ideological 
trends imported into the UK with the arrival of the early South Asian settler 
communities in the 1960s and 1970s.174 Writing on the appeal of Salafism to British 
Muslim youth, Hamid notes that the 1990s were the defining era for second-
generation Islamic revival and activism and that this decade was the most intense for 
its identity politics and the growth of Salafism in the UK.175 He notes that an 
important factor in championing the Salafi perspective was the perception that its 
adherents had ‘superior religious knowledge’ as ‘they were seen to be demonstrably 
practising Islam according to the Qur’an and “authentic Sunnah” and gained respect 
for coming to the aid of fellow Muslims in physical danger’.176 The globalisation of 
well-funded Saudi Salafi discourse, complimented by the funding of mosques, the 
pre-eminent presence of Salafism on the internet and the influx of graduates from 
the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia is also attributable to the 
attractiveness of Salafism at the time.177 Compared with other Muslim groups, the 
Salafi trend seemed to offer a cohesive identity that young people could purchase, a 
type of all-in-one package, which could explain its relatively stronger attraction for 
converts seeking a “rationalised Islam”.178  
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Running concurrently, in the mid to late 1990s there was an apparent policy of wilful 
blindness by British authorities to militant Islamist activity in the UK which with the 
benefit of reflection represented a poor strategic decision which would influence 
latter developments. Evidence reveals that of all Islamist-inspired terrorist 
convictions in the UK between 1999 and 2009 almost 70 per cent of the offences 
were committed by Britons.179 In the years following al Qaeda’s operations in Africa 
in the late 1990s, and especially after 9/11, the British government began to alter its 
approach of tolerance to Salafi groups, such that the so-called “Londonistan” or safe 
haven of the 1990s gradually came to an end.180 The UK government adopted a 
more robust and proactive approach to individuals (Salafi-Jihadis) who incited 
violence including prominent proselytisers Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri Mohammed and 
Abu Qatada, by seeking their deportation and closing down their places of worship 
such as Finsbury Park Mosque. According to Neumann, the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
provided Salafists with a renewed sense of purpose’ and ‘created a more supportive 
environment which Salafi jihadists could draw on for finance and recruits.181 In the 
case of the UK, the threat of UK home-grown terrorism against the UK ‘increased 
substantially’ following the invasion of Iraq.182  The proceeding sections will examine 
the differing perspectives which exist within the literature as to the role that religion 
plays in the mobilisation of Salafi-Jihadist foreign fighters in Syria.   
 
Salafi-Jihadism is Void of Religious Ideology 
One of the strongest proponents of this position is Oliver Roy who contends that 
‘Jihadis do not descend into violence after pouring over sacred texts, as they do not 
have the necessary religious culture. They do not become radicals because they have 
misread the texts and the paucity of religious knowledge among Jihadis is glaring’.183 
Contemporary Salafi-Jihadism in the UK according to Roy is a youth movement that 
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is not only constructed independently of parental religion and culture, but is also 
rooted in wider youth culture.184  European jihadists he observes have Muslim 
backgrounds, but they are not religious, and none has a past of piety. Rather, their 
route into Jihadism is facilitated by a broader disaffection from the societies into 
which they were integrated and as an act of rebellion. gives them ‘a cause, a label, a 
grand narrative to which they can add the bloody signature of their personal revolt,’ 
in the way extremist left-wing ideologies did for some in the 1960s and 1970s.185 
Roy’s position firmly reflects ascribing to a “push” factors approach.  
 
According to a 2013 ICSR report’s finding, not everyone who joined a Syrian jihadist 
group from the UK was motivated by a ‘fully formed jihadist worldview’ and their 
research which relied largely on social media monitoring, concluded in many cases 
the Jihadist ideology was only adopted once in Syria and in close proximal contact 
with more hardened fighters.186 This statement potentially correlates with the 
findings of Marc Sageman who argued that social networks are more crucial to 
Salafi-Jihadism than religious ideology.187 Much of the social media discourse from 
foreign fighters did not appear overly religious in content and pointed more to the 
hostile othering of the West and employed terms such as kuffar and apostates and 
even with the character limitations that Twitter had at the time, they did not engage 
in Qu’ranic or Salafist influencer quoting.  
 
In February 2013, Ibrahim al-Mazwagi became the first British-born casualty of the 
conflict in Syria. A 21 year-old university graduate from north London, he was killed 
as he took part in combat against the Assad regime.188 While not claiming to be 
representative of the entire population who travelled to Syria for extremist 
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purposes, the Channel 4 news interview with al-Mazwagi broadcast in June 2013, is 
fascinating as it is equally troubling when he is asked to explain what Jihad is, and 
struggles to conjure up an answer, initially replying jokingly that “Jihad it is to kick 
Obama’s butt”.189  
 
 
The UN’s 2017 report on foreign fighters concluded that in their sample of 
interviewees (43 in total), when directly asked about the influence of ideology over 
their decision to go to Syria, only 10 respondents (23 per cent), stated that ideology 
was ‘extremely important,’ with one more saying that it was ‘very important’.190 The 
researchers also found that very few of their sample believe in the idea of an Islamic 
State or of establishing a Caliphate in the Levant. Only seven respondents stated that 
at least in part they were motivated to go to Syria to help establish the Caliphate.191 
 
The former British Counterterrorism Chief (for MI5 and MI6) Richard Barrett, has 
noted that reasons for Britain’s going to Syria vary for different individuals, but 
among youth in the Middle East and North Africa in particular, a profound sense of 
disillusionment was a very common theme.192 According to Barrett many who travel 
to Syria profess motivations focusing on a sense of religious duty, but Barrett 
counters this with the argument that ‘religion really is a gloss over a much deeper 
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desire for a sense of identity and purpose and belonging’ among people seeking 
direction and fulfillment.”193      
 
Religion as Key to Salafi-Jihadism Radicalisation 
In contrast to the position of Roy there is a strong body of literature and research 
which argues that religion plays a key functionality in radicalising people toward a 
Salafi-Jihadist perspective. One such position propagated by Gilles Keppel which 
resulted in a very public disagreement of position with Roy, argues one cannot 
separate violent jihadism from the nonviolent forms of Salafism, and stresses the 
importance of such religious beliefs in creating the conditions for being drawn to 
terrorism. Quintan Wiktorowicz’s research claimed that most Salafis spend their 
time learning about Islam in pursuit of living the purist Muslim life. He expanded 
further by examining the Jihadi branch, stating that ‘even jihadis devote most of 
their time to education and the acquisition of religious knowledge: they spend more 
time with the Qu’ran than a Kalashnikov’.194  Given that this was written in 2005, it 
would be interesting were Wiktorowicz to re-examine this statement to see if the 
radicalisation has morphed as a consequence of the Syrian conflict. Dawson and 
Amarasingam’s research concluded that their interviewee’s lives ‘are saturated with 
a Salafi-Jihadist religio-political discourse’. Consequently, they argued, their 
religiosity, could be interpreted as critical to understanding their motivations.195 A 
UK interviewee in their study cited the allure of Jihad from reading the Qur’an as a 
pull factor:  
The zeal for jihad always struck me when I would sit in my room and read Qur’an with 
English translation. I would wonder how jihad was fought today. At the outbreak of 
2011 war in Syria, the thinking of going began and brothers from town who had gone 
were an inspiration.196  
 
Dawson and Amarasingam are quite emphatic in their research findings, concluding 
that on the basis of their sample (which they wholly acknowledge has its limitations) 
nothing would happen without the framing work done by ideology; as they put it, 
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‘radical action depends on seeing the world in new ways’. Consequently, the Salafi-
jihadist religiosity of these foreign fighters, their ideology, according to their 
empirical research is paramount in interpreting their actions.197  
 
An ICSR report in 2015 which examined the motivations of Europeans to depart for 
Syria and Iraq reported that faith and ideology played a larger role than previously 
acknowledged in the early days of the conflict.198 Their first report in 2013 reached 
different conclusions – but ISIS had not formally announced its presence on the 
battlefields by that time, and intra-Muslim fighting was still in its infancy. Rand and 
Vasselo’s analysis, based on social media, examined the reasons posted by people 
who traveled abroad to partake in violent action in Syria. They identified four 
prominent motivational themes, two of which correlate with the Salafi-Jihadist 
ideology, namely: ‘the belief that the fight to establish a caliphate in the Levant and 
Iraq is part of a larger struggle by Sunnis against both the West and Shi’a Islam’ and; 
‘the belief that the fight in Syria is a defensive struggle by the Ummah (the global 
community of Muslim believers) against the corrupt and apostate Assad regime’.199 
This research was based on social media posts, and compliments that of Dawson and 
Amarasingam not only in findings but having used different data points it creates 
more legitimacy for this claim.  
 
Conclusion 
While the debate on religion and ideology continues, it is beyond the scope of this 
project to come down fully on one side on the other. It is entirely plausible that 
some Jihadists are motivated by a genuine (pre-existing) religious commitment, as 
they see it through their lens, and that their actions are directly grounded in this 
commitment. But equally, it also entirely possible that others become Jihadists not 
out of religious commitment and were not remotely religious at the time that they 
became involved in Jihadists activism. Both Roy and Kepel for example, present 
 
197 Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam “Talking to Foreign Fighters” p.196. 
198 Peter Neumann, “Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors” ICSR, 
September 2015, p.9. 
199 Dafna Rand and Anthony Vassalo, “Bringing the Fight Back Home: Western Foreign Fighters in Iraq 
and Syria,” Policy Brief, Center for a New American Security (2014), p. 2. 
 55 
compelling arguments to support their opposing perspectives, but I would argue a 
case that both positions are routed in Franco-centric background, and perhaps are 
not as applicable to the UK as to France whose secular society and colonial history 
mark its uniqueness.  
 
A weakness of this study – and of much research in this area - is that it focused on 
evidence and material obtained from those already in Syria and this represents to 
some extent a line already crossed. Foreign fighters in Syria, in possession of their 
phones or devices with connectivity to the internet, are most likely to have been 
through some form of basic training and indoctrination of a particular religious 
persuasion will have been conducted. Therefore, we are in a state where it is difficult 
to assess whether the individuals ended up with a Salafi-Jihadist perspective because 
of prior religiosity, or if their current position is a manifestation of their religious 
training in Syria. Notwithstanding the previous points, I believe there is a weight in 
slight favour of the argument that the Salafist-Jihadist ideology is influential in the 
recruitment of British fighters for Syria and Iraq. This assertion is balanced with the 
belief that an individual’s knowledge of this ideology may be patchy at best but that 
















CHAPTER 4 - The Ummah as a Global Community 
 
Introduction 
This thesis explores how narratives can be persuasive and resilient and can inspire an 
individual toward adopting a particular point of view and subsequently pursue a 
certain course of action. In the course of this chapter, it will be demonstrated how 
the narratives of foreign fighters and recruiters are conveying a sense of belonging 
to the Ummah, and that owing to its messaging being contained in a narrative 
context, a subsequent reaction is elicited from the person. The Ummah is being 
examined distinctly, and not as part of the ideology chapter for a number of reasons. 
Primary amongst these is the fact that much of the foreign fighter rhetoric available 
in the early stages of the conflict cited the need to help brother’s and sisters a key 
feature of the Ummah’s doctrine. At the time of researching it was unexpected how 
much territory ISIS would gain, and subsequently lose, but the Ummah converged 
into a physical (albeit unrecognised) state for a minority of the Muslim population 
who ascribed to this group’s extreme views. Furthermore, the Ummah’s correlation 
with an imagined community, conceptually converges with the narrative world and 
therefore warranted specific detailing.  
 
The term Ummah is found 64 times in the Qur’an and appears frequently in the 
Hadith (the recorded words and deeds of the Prophet Mohammed).200 Relying on 
translations within the context of where the term is cited, has revealed that Ummah 
has multiple and diverse meanings in the Qur’an, for example referring to ‘a single 
person, a way, a period of time, and people of a group’.201 However, it is the Hadith 
that conveyed a more focused notion of Ummah, in referring to the Prophet’s 
followers or communities, rather than to any community.202  However, as Ali 
contends, in spite of the numerous and often vague meanings in Islam’s early days, it 
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evolved and ‘came to symbolise and embody the very notion of an Islamic 
community’.203   
 
In this chapter I will examine how the Ummah differs from the traditional definition 
of the nation state not only legally but with regard to the softer elements of 
statehood such as customs and language. I will then focus on the concept of the 
imagined community and how the Ummah has been described as encompassing this  
by leading academics in this field. I will examine British perceptions of the concept of 
Ummah. Finally I will provide evidence for how the Ummah has evolved to be 
employed as a justification for violent action and provide empirical evidence from 
Syria and Iraq for this position.  
 
The Ummah and the Nation State 
While the Ummah is often presented as an alterative to the concept of the nation 
state, these two concepts also have some elements in common. According to Smith 
the nation is defined as ‘a named community possessing an historic territory, shared 
myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs’.204 
Since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, all nations draw boundaries to 
define membership in the national community and with regard to the nation, there 
are both formal and legal criteria of citizenship.  
 
It is an important observation to highlight that prior to the Peace of Westphalia, 
religion had a critical role in shaping the political landscape, but Westphalia 
consigned religion to a secondary position, for obvious reasons.205 Nationalism is a 
secular political ideology which, it is argued, demands paramount loyality and 
therefore conflicts with the ideal of the Ummah.206 As Ali observes ‘…the idea of 
“nation above everything” is incompatible with that of “Islam above everything”’ 
and that ‘nationalism in this sense demands secularism, which will lead to the 
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destruction of the possibility of the unity of the Muslim Ummah…’.207 Essentially, 
identification with the Ummah (or identifying with such an entity) offers a challenge 
to identity and community circumscribed by national borders. 
 
The notion that the Muslim community could perhaps be considered a diaspora is 
contested by Sayyid who states that it is ‘an unlikely metaphor’ as there is no 
homeland from which Muslims were displaced or to where they wish to return.208 
Muslim theology divides the world into two spheres of influence: the Dar al-Islam 
(‘The Abode of Islam’) and the Dar al-Harb, or Dar al-Kufr (‘The Abode of War’ or, 
‘Unbelief’) and according to Poston ‘only under special circumstances is the Muslim 
allowed to live for any time in a non-Muslim land’.209 The universality of Islam 
precludes any concept of a homeland as such, with prominent Islamist theoretician 
of the twentieth century, Sayyid Qutb, declaring that a Muslim should have no 
nationality except his belief.210 Westphalian sovereignty, the most central element of 
the state-based order, stands in direct opposition to the view espoused by groups 
such as ISIS in which sovereignty is the property of God alone.211  
 
In addition to the formal and legal criteria of citizenship of a nation, there are 
symbolic and sociological dimensions of belonging such as class, religion, ethnicity 
and race. Ali lists six concepts upon which he contends nationalism is based ‘…unity, 
origin, language, tradition, history, and love of land’ and he argues that none are 
contradictory to the concept of Islamic Ummah.212 It is noteworthy bearing in mind 
Qutb’s declaration, that Ali cited ‘love of the land’ and not territory.  
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In his research Robert Saunders, compared the strength of feeling associated with 
nationalism to that of membership of the global Ummah concluding that the latter 
‘will, in certain cases fill the role played by nation-states’.213 The idea of the Ummah 
has been an important element of Islamic thought, particularly during the decline of 
the Ottoman Empire before World War I, and has been closely associated with the 
preservation of the Caliphate.214  The abolition of the Caliphate by Mustafa Kemal 
the founding president of modern-day independent Turkey in 1924 has been 
described by one Islamist movement as ‘representing the essence of betrayal of 
Islam’ and its re-establishment is considered an obligation by Salafi-Jihadists.215  
 
The Ummah as an Imagined Community 
Conceptually as has been demonstrated, the Ummah incorporates the Muslim 
community into the world as a whole. Some scholars discuss the status of this 
community as being imagined given that it transcends so many traditional markers 
of a nation state. Anderson’s description of an ‘imagined political community’ may 
be usefully applied here to an ‘imagined global community’ or the Ummah. 
Anderson defines the nation as an ‘imagined political community’ in which a 
member of a nation will never know or even see most of his co-nationals no matter 
how small the nation, yet they feel an interconnectedness or a ‘deep, horizontal 
comradeship’.216 An imagined community is not devoid of reality, but in this instance 
the imagined community of the Ummah is a powerful source of identity for a large 
population dispersed globally, of varying ethnicities and with different political and 
social agendas. Hassan’s review of the evolution of the Ummah concludes that over 
time it ‘…became state of mind, a form of social consciousness, or an imagined 
community which united the faithful in order to lead a virtuous life and to safeguard 
and even to expand the boundaries of the autonomous Ummah’.217  
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Echaibi contends that the Ummah is a strategic rhetorical tool ‘…deployed as a 
rallying cry to establish a transnational political entity that transcends the very 
notion of the nation state’.218 When examining the concept of the Ummah in the 
context of geopolitical developments, what also appears is that the sense of 
belonging to this community intensifies during crises. The belief in the shared 
community has been invoked, with varying intensity at different times and places.219  
Given that the Ummah transcends traditional national territorial boundaries can in 
fact result in local events and issues potentially becoming less meaningful or 
influential to members of the community if they feel that there are more pressing 
international issues. This appears to consequently become a cyclical process 
nourishing the community of Muslims, whereby identifying with global concerns in 
turn impacts on how one perceives being a Muslim regardless of nationality and this 
global interconnectedness creates new affiliations amongst geographically diffused 
people. It has been argued that Salafi-Jihadism is an unintended side-effect of 
globalisation, which has created a new cohort of international fighters with loyalty 
only to their imagined Ummah.220  
 
British Perception of the Ummah 
While the issue of identity will be the subject of a later chapter, this section aims to 
outline how British Muslims identify themselves in the context of their nationalities 
as it provides a valuable context for subsequent analysis. According to the most 
recent census data available (2011) Muslims make up just 5 per cent of the 
population in Britain but belong to the second largest faith group, numbering 2.7 
million. Muslims have the youngest age structure – over 50 per cent are under the 
age of 24. Furthermore, nearly 45 per cent of British Muslims are born in the UK and 
thus constitute the second or third generation.221  
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Almost 12 years ago, behaviour and attitudes research conducted by Pew found that 
British Muslims tended to identify with their religion in the first instance as opposed 
to their nationality.222 A recently published IPSOS MORI research report found that 
religion is a far more important part of the life for most Muslims than it is for other 
people in Britain, and is central to their sense of identity.223 Asma Mustafa’s research 
found that ‘spheres of influence that used to be accepted, such as parents, elders 
and cultural dictates, have been swept aside by young Muslims in favour of religious 
decrees and spiritual guidance’.224 In a similar sense, Raza argues that many Muslims 
have two sets of identities. This first strand of identity ‘will be with Allah, His 
Messenger and Islam….by virtue of this identity the Muslim will belong to the 
Ummah (community)…irrespective of any national and international boundaries’.225 
The second set of identity ‘will be with the state of which they are naturalised 
citizens…Muslims are expected to become good citizens of the country in which they 
are resident, and follow its laws’.226 For British Muslims, this obligation to be a part 
of two communities with such loyalty can be difficult to manage, especially when the 
two may have competing strategies and goals.  
 
The concept of the Ummah implies that the interests of British Muslims are not 
confined to Britain but extend beyond its borders through the diaspora and global 
Ummah, which is facilitated by the advancements in information and 
communications technology. Cyberspace promotes a homogenous, de-territorialised 
form of Islam, one that has cut its links to many Islamic traditions and has witnessed 
the shifting of religious authority from the control of a diverse ulema (learned 
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religious leaders).227 This in turn, allows online “Ummahists” as Saunder’s has coined 
them, to exert influence displacing traditional authority sources such as the Ulema, 
local leaders and politicians.228 The internet stands in for the idea of the Ummah, the 
mythologised Muslim community making this utopian community concrete, because 
one can interact with it.229 As evidenced, trans-Atlantic fibre-optic optic cables have 
become a vehicle to transform a local concern into a global cause and vice versa. 
 
Preeminent political scientist Olivier Roy’s assessment of the current allure of the 
Ummah as a distinct alternative to national identity in the UK is conveyed succinctly 
in the following and very worthy of reproduction in its entirety in spite of its length:  
…many second or third generation European Muslims in, say, France and the UK are 
said to experience a conflict of identity: born and raised in Europe, they no longer 
identify with the country and/or culture in which their parents or grandparents were 
brought up, yet they also feel excluded from Western society, which still perceives them 
as foreigners. For them, the idea of becoming “citizens” of the Ummah – a virtual 
Islamic nation removed from territory and national culture – may be more attractive 
than for first generation immigrants.230 
 
As Saunders surmises ‘Ummahism has found fertile ground in the marginalised 
Muslim ghettos of European cities’.231 It could be therefore argued, that the greatest 
boost to the materialisation of the Ummah as a nation has stemmed from 
postcolonial Muslim emigration from Dar-al-Islam to Europe.232 In spite of the 
existence of various Islamic scholars’ declarative statements concerning Muslim’s 
living in non-Muslim countries, the era of globalisation has witnessed unprecedented 
flows of migration across the world, and the choice to live in a Muslim country has 
become more difficult to balance with the socio-economic opportunities that may 
exist elsewhere.233 Over time, Muslims and their descendants who re-located to 
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countries such as the UK and France in particular have adapted (to varying degrees, 
depending on the perspective) to the conditions of living outside the Muslim world. 
For many, part of this adaptation has included strengthening the concept of the 
Ummah.234 
 
Groups such as al-Muhajiroun and Hizb ut-Tahrir235 promote in the UK, the idea of 
the Ummah and that boundaries are alien to Islam, artificial and a legacy of 
colonisation of Muslim lands.236 However, it is an important distinction to make 
between the two groups in that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology is assessed as being 
revolutionary but strictly non-violent, whereas al-Muhajiroun is an ideologically 
related group but one which focuses on the necessity of taking part in conflicts 
worldwide which they perceive as ‘Muslim struggles’ in order to establish a 
Caliphate.237 In the UK, with the increase in media coverage of such groups, coupled 
with tabloid interest in social media output, suspicion about the loyalty of Muslims 
to their nations states has increased. This has been exponentially heightened since 
the London’s mass-casualty terrorist attack on 7 July 2005, arguably attributable to 
the fact that three of the four perpetrators of the attacks were born in the UK.  
 
One final point that requires addressing is the grievances that are described by many 
as ‘perceived’ on the part Muslims in the UK and Europe. Often it is highlighted that 
mainstream European media outlets construct Euro-Muslims as a community of 
secluded, distrustful, and alien economic underachievers. Research conducted into 
Muslims in the UK media which was based on a content analysis of 974 newspaper 
articles about British Muslims and Islam in the press from 2000 to 2008, concluded 
that the coverage of British Muslims tended to focus on Muslims as ‘a threat’ or as ‘a 
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problem’.238 In a similar study assessing the almost 2,800 news items, of which 60% 
were Muslim related Hickman, Nickels and Silvestri found the Muslim community to 
have been predominantly defined in juxtaposition to perceived ‘British’ values. For 
example, the communities are deemed ‘suspect’ and judged by news publishers as 
groups who do not share these values.239  
 
The Ummah as Justification for Violent action 
Some argue that when a religion offers rules for society, the group of believers are 
offered a very privileged opening to interpret those religious rules as a guide for the 
political management of the public sphere. In this respect monotheistic religions, 
with their emphasis on the oneness of God, are particularly disposed to expansive 
interpretations that conceive a global religious order.240 Furthermore, of relevance 
to this section, in all three Abrahamic monotheistic faiths (Islam, Christianity and 
Judaism), Post states ‘there is language that has been interpreted not only to permit 
killing, but where killing in the name of God becomes a sacred obligation’.241  
 
With political Islam rising in prominence after the 1970s, the concept of the Ummah 
has been harnessed regularly by extremist organisations to garner support.242 Oliver 
Roy characterises the split in Islamist ideology since the 1980s as a choice between 
integration and normalisation within the framework of the state, and what he terms 
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as ‘‘neo-fundamentalism’.243 This neo-fundamentalism is explained as a restrictive, 
‘scripturalist and conservative view of Islam’ that rejects the national dimension in 
favour of the Ummah.244 Islamist militants have been taught that they have an 
obligation to respond to the difficulties and troubles of the Ummah, and that the 
religiously correct response to physical assaults against the Ummah, the oppressed 
brothers and sisters is ‘jihad’’.245  The Islamic legal definition of Jihad is to fight, and 
is a ritualistic act which has a spectrum stretching from offensive jihad which is a 
considered and deliberate act designed to make territorial acquisitions, and 
defensive jihad which arises organically and spontaneously in response to external 
political events.246 This might include foreign invasion, civil unrest, or another series 
of events resulting in the breakdown of social order.247 
 
What, then, is the Salafi intellectual framework? It may be generally defined as a 
variant of ‘pan-Islamism’. This term refers to those religious or political transnational 
movements that emphasize the unity of the Ummah (the community of believers) 
over specific cultural, national, or ethnic loyalties and that the Ummah is an entity 
under siege.248 Salafi-Jihadists are observed to attempt to instil in fellow Muslims the 
belief that the only identity that truly matters is that of membership in the Ummah, 
and that it subsequently bestows comfort, dignity, security and honour on 
Muslims.249 The message below posted by the wife of a British foreign fighter killed 
fighting for ISIS illustrates the glory of violence which is present in Salafist-Jihadist 
ideology and the pride and honour his widow claims to exude through her Twitter 
account. 
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Another characteristic of discourse from foreign fighters is their choice of word to 
describe their location i.e. al-Sham. This is an inherited trait from AQ who, when 
naming their franchises grants them geographical references (al Qaeda in the land of 
two rivers, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). In 
doing so, ISIS (and AQ) avoids a name that could be interpreted as granting 
legitimacy to the Westphalian system and to authorities in the particular states it 
targets.250 In social media posts across all platforms Syria is referred to as Sham by 
the foreign fighter contingent indicating indoctrination into the community of 
Salafist-Jihadist groups there. What is additionally of interest and evidenced from 
the message below, that al-Sham is quoted in the context of scriptural references 




Another feature of foreign fighter communication is the posed imagery almost 
always features the narrator proselytising with the index finger of his right hand 
extended as if pointing to the sky. The Jihadi interpretation of al-Tawheed a 
monotheistic doctrine at the centre of Islam is a central feature of Salafi-Jihadist 
ideology as previously discussed. Al-Tawheed, the uncompromising faith in the 
‘Oneness of God’, has provided Salafis with a rich and complex body of literature to 
explain this doctrine and guide Muslims on the beliefs and practices that cultivate 
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and maintain this strict monotheistic faith.251 As the image below illustrates, foreign 
fighters choose make this very simple gesture, but one that is laden with symbolism 





The Narrative that Ummah is a Site of Improvement and Uplift 
Perhaps the most ignominious and insidious aspect of current ISIS-related 
propaganda is that of “lifestyle-shaming” which is evidenced on all social media 
platforms and is not exclusive to Twitter, albeit it is particularly prevalent on the 
latter given its characteristics of imagery combined with optional short textual 
messages. The tactic, which is an adaptation of a label associated with cyber bulling, 
is perhaps self-explanatory: it involves attempts to influence receivers of messages 




Cognisant that many conventional individual and social practices in the UK are 
considered ‘forbidden’ in the Salafist-Jihadist puritanical interpretation of Islam, 
nationalistic semiotics are employed in the hope of fostering guilt and ultimately, 
anti-nationalism and the references to home comforts are commonly deployed it 
appears in the hope of illiciting a negative response. Ultimately it appears that the 
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aim is to foster a feeling of alienation from mainstream British society and the 
perceived materialism which is believed to dominate Western culture. Using 
terminology such as kuffar as witnessed in the below tweet is illustrative of this type 




However, this psychological warfare is carefully balanced with appealing to 
prospective fighter’s trivial home comforts in an effort to impress upon them that 
there will be some familiarity in their new home. Such statements (like the one 
below) are an interesting balance to the general lifestyle-shaming that occurs and 
perhaps illustrative of the true desires of British fighters, balanced with the need to 
recruit and draw more recruits by alluding to something that both parties can 




Being part of the Ummah, and more importantly coming to the defence of the 
Ummah it is conveyed, will lead to personal improvement and enhancement. For a 
Salafist-Jihadist one cannot live a full life as a Muslim in the land of the Kuffar and 
therefore travelling to the Syrian/Iraqi lands can free you and make you a part of 
something bigger, something better. Tweets from Syria and Iraq are illustrative of 
the perception that living in a Muslim country demonstrates to fighters how much 





In 2014 a group referring to themselves as Rayat al Tawheed, claimed to include a 
number of British Jihadis within their ranks in Syria. Active across all social media 
platforms, they made a number of references on Twitter to the requirement of all 
Muslims to make the Hijra to the lands of al-Sham. Their imagery featured 
references to the necessity for “real men” implying that the individual who ignores 
the call is somewhat inferior. This is illustrative of the boundary marking 




As indicated in Chapter 2, we can identify the grievance narrative as being 
instrumental to British foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. In this vein, ISIS relies 
heavily upon the victimhood narrative, the idea that the global community of (Sunni) 
Muslims are being persecuted by a global conspiracy, ‘to justify not only its most 
heinous acts, but also its very existence’.252  ISIS leader Al-Baghdadi paints Sunni 
Muslims as victims, who are persecuted and in despair and by labelling them as 
underdogs to the ‘other’ (the subjugators) creates a symbolic divide that reinforces 
the importance of defending the Ummah. Social media then depicts images of 
fighters setting passports alight, destroying the very symbol of their official national 
citizenship status and symbolically completing their separation from the ‘other’.     
 






In the Prophet’s Sunnah he is quoted as saying ‘the believers, in their mutual mercy, 
love and compassion, are like a single body; if one part of it feels pain the rest of the 
body will join it in staying awake and suffering fever’.253 This leads to the observation 
that emotions are important to the conceptualisation of the Ummah’ and confer an 
emotional legitimacy.254 Smith adds, ‘there is a felt filiation, as well as a cultural 
affinity, with a remote past in which a community was formed, a community that 
despite all the changes it has undergone, is still in some sense recognised as the 
‘‘same’’ community’.255 The employment of the Ummah doctrine in foreign fighter 
recruitment discourse represents not only a divergence from the Westphalian socio-
political norm but also a fundamental contradiction in identity. As Mendelsohn 
argues, while many violent non-state groups with whom present-day foreign fighters 
are affiliated have historically criticised nationalist structures to ‘make space for a 
true a-nationalistic, ethnicity-surmounting Islamic order’, their recruitment strategy 
often capitalises on these ‘imagined’ communities, as this image illustrates.256  
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A study of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s address on 4 July 2014 through which he 
ceremoniously declared the formation of the Caliphate (Islamic State) and himself as the 
self-proclaimed Caliph (successor of the prophet Muhammad and politico-religious ruler 
of the Ummah) provides an opportunity to examine the master narrative given his status 
as the self-declared leader of the largest terrorist organisation in Syria and one which is 
intrinsicly connected with the concept of the global Ummah. He offers a narrative that is 
all encompassing and simplistic towards Muslims, fixating on particular evils they may 
face and a sole answer: devotion to the Islamic State - a utopia for all those who 
subscribe to the terror group’s version of faith. He speaks of the responsibility one has 
to travel to IS-established land and join the fight stating ‘O Muslims everywhere, 
whoever is capable of performing hijrah to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because 
hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory.257 Al-Baghdadi invites [directs] all dissatisfied 
Muslims to perform hijrah and to partake in Jihad from all over the world and to identify 
themselves as its Ummah.258 Jihad, is the ultimate litmus test of one’s faith to this 
struggle in Safalist-Jihadist doctrine. This is translated then in the messaging by 
British recruits in Syria through their social media as demonstrated below.  
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Though most of the Muslim world has been subjected to the nation state model, the 
concept of the Ummah is retained as a strong, resilient theme among the Muslim 
community. Belonging to the Ummah means being part of a movement that reaches 
back in history and reaches out into the future and transcends time and place. As a 
member of the Ummah, the individual finds a larger-than-life cause and becomes 
part of something greater than one’s self.259 Notwithstanding the evidence above 
much of the commentary and research on the Ummah that was unearthed for this 
thesis lacked consideration of the divisions and sectarianism which exists among 
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CHAPTER 5 - Identity: Who Am I? What Am I? 
 
Introduction 
Borum and Fein have suggested that foreign fighters typically enlist, or are recruited, 
based on one or more of three basic motivations: greed; grievance; and identity.260 
This chapter will examine the latter and how narratives express a sense of identity. 
Firstly I will introduce social identity theory as it forms the spine for this chapter’s 
analysis. I will discuss the process of Identity-stripping and de-individuation and the 
creation of the collective identity and subsequent “we-narratives”. Using empirical 
data I will demonstrate how impression management and self-presentation are 
particularly prevalent in foreign fighter social media through imagery, which we 
know to be a potent facet of communication. 
 
Recalling the review of radicalisation in chapter 2, the essence of the process 
involves ‘the management of one’s identity’.261 Shiraz Maher contends that ‘issues of 
identity have long been recognised as being central to radicalisation’ and attributes 
this as being fundamental to the recruitment of Western foreign fighters by 
extremist groups in Syria and Iraq.262 Studies on radicalisation find identity to stand 
at the fore of the radicalisation process as success partially lies in the radical’s ability 
to provide the “radical-to-be” with a distinctive identity.263 Schwartz et.al. assert that 
in the conflict between fundamentalist Islam and the West, ‘the threats are largely 
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(London: ICSR, 2015).  
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Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory holds a number of important implications for the study of how 
people become members of terrorist organisations and therefore will be the focus of 
the proceeding analysis. It is primarily interested in the socio-cognitive processes 
underlying group dynamics and how they shape identity.265 Social identities are 
reflections of the social categories, groups, and networks into which individuals 
belong and social categories are broad, “large-scale” sources of social identity of 
which religion is an example.266 The chapter will analyse individual engagement in 
terrorism through the lens of social identity theory, and focus on the extent to which 
individuals identify themselves in terms of group membership.267 The central tenet 
of the relatively new theory is that individuals define their identities along two 
dimensions: social, defined by membership in various social groups; and personal, 
the idiosyncratic attributes that distinguish an individual from others.268 There is a 
dual functionality to the self and identity as individuals are evidenced to seek to 
belong to groups with a sense of common history and purpose.269 But equally 
identity needs to provide individuals with the ability to distinguish themselves from 
others, and allow for groups to constantly reconstruct their identities in order to 
adapt to ever-changing social realities. 
 
Schwartz et.al. contend that those studying terrorism, in particular westerners, have 
made a number of critical errors including maintaining that individuals engaged in 
terrorism do so because they are “searching” for an identity.270 The researchers in 
this instance argue the contrary that individuals engage in terrorism as an expression 
of the identity they already have developed or have been assigned.271  This is a very 
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Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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relevant assertion for this chapter, as it exemplifies the difference between the 
process of radicalisation and the role that identity plays in the process. As the 
authors of the paper describe:  
 
Feelings of disenfranchisement from mainstream society are not uncommon among 
young people, but in few cases does this prompt a person to become a suicide bomber. 
However, such feelings of disenfranchisement, when coupled with fervent adherence to 
traditional dichotomous “us versus them”” religious principles justifying violence 
against those perceived to threaten one’s religious or cultural group, a strong 
prioritisation of the group over the individual, and a belief that one’s group is morally 
superior to the group being attacked, may combine to make terrorism considerably 
more likely.272 
 
The following analysis will address the key issues raised in the above statement 
paying particular attention to the role of religiosity. In her research on violent 
Islamist extremism in the Muslim diaspora, Dina al Raffie found that a contributor to 
individuals becoming radicalised into a Salafist-jihadist mindset involves creating the 
identity of a person which is based on a ‘puritanical interpretation of Islam that 
imbues the individual with a sense of moral and spiritual superiority, setting him/her 
aside from the rest of society’.273  
 
Sadek Hamid compliments this assertion by stating that those who joined the Salafi 
da’wa movement in Britain meant ‘acquiring membership of a multi-ethnic 
supranational identity’.274 Quintan Wiktorowicz’s study on al Muhajiroun provides a 
relevant and confirmatory example of this theory discussion. According to his 
research, most of those who eventually became members of al Muhajiroun 
experienced a serious identity crisis prior to their initial stages of participation.275  He 
highlights how  
individuals were trapped between two competing socialisation environments: a) 
secular British society and institutions that proposed equity but in reality offered 
discrimination; and b) the traditional home with its passive religious values and 
narrow focus on the Muslim community and rituals.276  
 
272 Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel & Alan S. Waterman “Terrorism” p.540. 
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275 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al Muhajiroun and Radical Islam”, p.15 available at 
http://www.yale-university.com/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/papers/wiktorowicz-
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Complimenting al Raffie’s previous assertion, an al Muhajiroun member was found 
to think about their identity in terms of religion rather than ethnicity.277  
 
Group Identity 
According to Jerrold M. Post, ‘one of the first prerequisites for terrorism is 
collectivism, that is, prioritising the group over the individual’. 278  In societies 
characterised by a predominance of collectivism over individualism, social identity 
takes precedence over personal identity.279 Berman and Laitin in their research on 
suicide bombers argue that members of radical organisations exhibit self-sacrificial 
behaviours due to a belief that the suicide mission will benefit their a) the 
community and/or; b) some larger cause.280 Group standards, Hogg et.al. suggest, 
ultimately become ‘the blueprint for the individual’s identity and subsequent 
behavior; the individual is “de-personalised”’.281 Kruglanski argues that radicalisation 
mandates a high commitment to the communal objectives and ideology of the 
group, and a low commitment to personal gains or alternative means of achieving 
objectives.282 Similarly, al Raffie highlights how self-categorisation theory suggests 
that the adoption of this collective identity by a group member will trump one’s 
personal, individual identity, as he/she becomes an extension of the collective 
whole.283  Rogers et.al. argue that  
when a valued social identity is perceived to be under threat from another group (e.g. 
when Islam is perceived to be under threat from ‘the West’) then those who identify 
strongly will tend to derogate and hold negative views towards the group posing the 
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threat. Because the social identity becomes a part of the self-concept, then a threat to 
the group is a threat to self.284  
Sadek Hamid’s research on Salafism and British Muslim youth discovered that 
membership of a jama’a (association) provided the ‘strong friendship networks that 
are a by-product of group identity’.285 What is striking in the most recent years is 
public discourse on the Ummah, this concept of a global community or group of 
Muslims. While this author does not contest the idea of Muslims identifying with 
Muslims, it is the persuasiveness of the concept of the Ummah in seemingly 
mobilising and providing a transnational identity and commonality that is of interest 
to this project. The Muslim community in Britain is different to the Muslim 
community in the USA and the Muslim community in France. But as illustrated 
previously, the Muslim community is interpreted by some as a global collective or 
imagined community. An imagined community is not devoid of reality, but in this 
instance the imagined community of the Ummah is a powerful source of identity for 
a large population dispersed globally, of varying ethnicities and with different 
political and social agendas.  
 
“Us Versus Them” 
As the individual becomes more embedded with the group and indeed becomes an 
extension of it and its identity, social identity theory holds that nearly all groups 
possess the implicit (or increasingly) explicit belief that they are in some way unique 
or superior to others.286 This assertion leads to the question of identity in this 
context being fundamentally a question of  “us versus them” and how this may be 
critical to the Salafist-Jihadist ideology. Social categories it is held, define imaginary 
boundaries, and they are ‘inherently discriminatory — though not necessarily 
negatively so — as they constitute norms and values that describe membership 
criteria and consequently set themselves apart from other social categories’.287  
 
 
284 Brooke Rogers, Kate M. Loewenthal, Christopher Alan Lewis, Richard Amlot, Marco Cinnirella and 
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285 Sadek Hamid “The Attraction of Authentic Islam”, p.391. 
286 Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour” pp.7-24. 
287 Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. White, "A Tale of Two Theories” p.259.  
 78 
Turner elaborated on the categorisation process in groups through his development 
of “self- categorization” theory, a cognitive process whereby individuals strengthen 
their social identity by emphasising intra-group similarities and intergroup 
similarities.288 According to Charles Perdue et.al. favouritism for the ingroup is so 
powerful that its effects can be elicited simply by the language we use.289 His 
research found ‘that subtly priming ingroup pronouns such as we, us, and ours 
triggered positive emotions in participants, while outgroup pronouns such as they, 
them, and theirs elicited negative emotions’.290 This is a significant finding for the 
study of how narratives may motivate an individual.  
 
Furthermore, social identity theory holds that one’s own group – the ingroup – may 
often be threatened when outgroups – groups regarded as standing in opposition to 
the ingroup – are perceived to be encroaching on the ingroup’s physical or 
psychological territory.291 An underlying assumption in terrorism studies is that a 
perception of threat to Islam is one of the main triggers of identity crises in Muslim 
youth.292 From the perspective of a young person in crisis, the perceived threat 
appears to bind the Ummah even closer together, no matter how dispersed their 
locations.  
 
A question which arose in the course of this chapter was, if the Salafi-Jihadist 
movement resembles more of an “identity” movement than a religious one? 
Research by J.M. Berger found that ‘identity movements are oriented toward 
establishing the legitimacy of a collective group’ which are organised on the basis of 
religion or other prima facie commonalities. He revealed that ‘movements become 
extreme when the in-group’s demand for legitimacy escalates to the point it can only 
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be satisfied at the expense of an out-group’.293  The current position of Salafi-Jihadist 
groups worldwide is to employ a violent hostility to the “out-group” which fuels their 
legitimacy as they demonstrate their perceived puritanical legitimacy.294  
 
Social identity theory highlights the need of the social collective for legitimacy, which 
serves to protect the community. When the existence of an identity group is 
challenged, members may respond by seeking out justifications for the in-group’s 
existence. These justifications may be more elaborate for “imagined communities,” 
that are defined by their conceptual nature rather than bounded by physical limits 
and interpersonal relationships, which is particularly true for the Salafi-Jihadi 
community who are dispersed globally.295 Anderson argued that communities based 
on nation, race or religion are highly (or wholly) conceptual and particularly prone to 
volatility in their search for such legitimacy. This need for legitimacy can therefore 
spiral out of control when an identity collective turns toward extremism.  
 
Identity is What? 
Identity is multifaceted and is about associating and affiliating rather than having a 
predetermined definition of who a person is. People everywhere and always have 
particular ties, self-understandings, stories, trajectories, histories, predicaments, and 
as such these inform the sorts of claims they make and communicate often via a 
narrative vehicle.296 Therefore, we are not referring to an autonomous object but a 
process by which social actors recognise themselves.297 In constructing one’s own 
identity, individuals are assessed to attribute coherence and meaning to the various 
phases of their own public and private history.298Gilroy insists that ‘identity provides 
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a way of understanding the interplay between our subjective experience of the 
world and the cultural and historical settings in which that fragile subjectivity is 
formed’.299 Hence the individual would be unable to create an identity in complete 
isolation of their social and cultural context.  
 
Matt Venhaus reviewed interview reports from 2,032 foreign fighters detained by 
Coalition forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay in order to ascertain a 
motivational typology for foreign fighters. He concluded ‘the recurring theme was 
that they all were looking for something – they wanted to understand who they are 
why they matter, and what their role in the world should be. They have an unfulfilled 
need to define themselves’.300 This finding complements the findings of Thomas 
Precht whose attempt to understand a person’s pathway to joining a foreign fight 
proposed that the most influential factor was ‘background’ which included personal 
struggles with identity, experience of injustice or discrimination and the need for 
belonging coupled with a lack of social integration.301 
 
In accepting that social identity theory is founded on the notion of social processes, 
further examination is required to examine how these processes may operate. It is 
believed that Stahelski’s research into social psychological conditioning is useful in 
this research as he identified a five-stage process employed by terrorists which 
aimed has at every juncture relevance to the individual’s identity.302   
 
Phase 1—Depluralisation: stripping away all other group member identities 
Phase 2—Self-deindividuation: stripping away each member’s personal identity 
Phase 3—Other-deindividuation: stripping away the personal identities of enemies 
Phase 4—Dehumanisation: identifying enemies as subhuman or nonhuman 
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 81 
Phase 5—Demonisation: identifying enemies as evil303 
 
Writing over a century ago, William James believed that human beings are prone 
toward plurality, and that we have many identities that can be adopted or dispensed 
of over a lifetime.304 Burke and Saets contend that an individual’s multiplicity of 
identities is correlated with the increased complexity within societies and how 
society has become more differentiated in terms of groups, organisation, and 
roles.305 Conventional wisdom suggests that the management of often perceived 
competing identities could pose difficulties for individuals, as their social interactions 
may produce a new premium identity that is incompatible with their existing ones. In 
their research on participation in justice and peace movements and how this 
correlated with the concept of identity, Hunt and Benford found that ‘identity talk 
can rely on a universe of discourse that allows for multiple identity alignment 
interpretations and expressions’.306 
 
Given the strict separation between church and state in Western democracies, 
Muslims are described as being conscious of the fact that public displays of 
religiosity are contrary to mainstream views that perceive acts of religiosity or 
religion to be a private affair.307 With the plausible subsequent feeling of little or no 
connection with their nation and exclusion from mainstream society, this may lead 
certain individuals to retreat to religion as a means of affirming what they potentially 
feel to be a ‘threatened self-identity’.308 Modern society exerts its own pressures on 
the formation of identity and a combination of socioeconomic and structural factors 
may rouse feelings of disaffection towards one’s home country, thereby creating a 
psychological barrier between the individual and their feeling of being able to fully 
identify as a national. Dalgaard-Nielsen refers to this situation as creating a ‘double 
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sense of non-belonging’.309 
 
Identity-Stripping 
In Stahelski’s research, the first two phases seek to erase an individual’s existing 
identities in favour of reconditioning with the group’s all-consuming, exclusive 
identity. Terrorist groups, it is argued, cannot effectively condition joiners unless the 
group is the joiners’ only group affiliation. An individual who has only one group 
affiliation has a self-concept and self-esteem that are totally dependent on retaining 
membership in that group. It is suggested in the literature that social identities 
provide status and enhance (or not as the case may be) self-esteem and that humans 
have a ‘need for self-esteem’.310 It is plausible therefore to assume that people with 
low self-esteem will be even more eager to engage in activities that are likely to raise 
self-esteem. 311  The completely dependent individual is therefore assessed by 
Stahelski ‘to be willing to do whatever it takes to retain membership in the group’.312  
 
The concept of identity-stripping raises an interesting question for those converts, 
who are already potentially striving to affirm their new status as Muslims within a 
community of similar people and whose self-concept and self-esteem is dependent 
on their retaining group membership.  In a discussion on the narratives of male 
converts in the UK, the dilemma of the convert in managing their identity is 
described as the convert holding ‘to a rope which is in constant motion in these two 
directions (past and present), threatening to hobble him in his endeavour to keep his 
person intact’.313 An example of the identity stripping process is most evident in the 
convert who commonly assumes a new name or nomme de guerre.314 While 
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conversion to Islam is not an indicator of future propensity for violence or terrorism, 
Silber and Bhatt point out in their discussion of converts ‘their need to prove their 
religious convictions to their companions often makes them the most aggressive’.315 
A briefing paper released by the ICCT in June 2016 concluded, cautiously, by saying 
that information available supports the hypothesis of convert overrepresentation in 
foreign fighter activities.316 Furthermore, statistically speaking, in 2017, it was 
estimated that converts make up 4 percent of the UK population but constitute 12 
percent of home-grown jihadists.317 The correlation between a convert’s identity 
stripping, assuming a new all-consuming group identity and participation in violence 
is tenuous given the absence of strong data to support or negate the theory but 
worthy of mention here.   
 
In Groups and Out Groups  
Phase 3, other-deindividuation, parallels joiner self-deindividuation. According to 
Stahelski we categorize our social world into those who are in the same groups as we 
are (“in” groups, “us”) and those who are not in our groups (“others,” “out” groups, 
“them”). To persuade people that they are one; that they compromise a bounded, 
distinctive solidarity group; that their internal differences do not matter, at least for 
the purpose at hand – this is normal and necessary part of politics, and not only of 
what is ordinarily characterised as “identity politics”.318 The narrative of European 
foreign fighters in their social media engagements was often discovered to include 
reference to “us” and “them” as illustrated below in this social media post captured 
by Site Intel. 
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People join movements not (only) because they think they can achieve their goals, 
but because the experience affords them the possibility of becoming recognised as a 
specific kind of person and as a member of a broader entity that shares similar 
values, interests, world views, or affective solidarity-ties—whether this notion of 
identity is pre-existing or whether it emerges in the context of on-going activity.319 
Reference to identity is essential in order to understand the mechanisms underlying 
individuals’ decisions to become involved in collective action.320 To identify with a 
movement according to Della Porta and Diani, entails feelings of solidarity towards 
people to whom one is not usually linked by direct personal contacts, but with whom 
one nonetheless shares aspirations and values.321 The Ummah facilitates such 
remote contact and the notion that the global community of Muslims is as one, in 
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Della Porta and Diani contend that ‘the presence of feelings of identity and of 
collective solidarity makes it easier to face the risks and uncertainties related to 
collective action’.322 A large proportion of foreign fighter social media engagement 
involving the use of imagery displays various weaponry, military-style clothing and 
general necessities for combat which this author interprets to be purposeful on two 
counts. Firstly, it is to inform the consumer that they will be a member of the group, 
as uniformity of clothing is crucial to military/paramilitary identity. And secondly, 
being a member of the group you will face potentially fatal consequences, as to be 
armed implies physical danger. 
 
Feeling part of a shared endeavor and identifying one’s own interests not only at the 
individual level but also at the collective level makes costs and risks more acceptable 
than they would otherwise have been. Physical risks and material deprivation, hardly 
rational from an individualistic, short-term perspective, may be justified if looked at as 
the costs attached to carrying on a longer-term historical project.323 
 
The demonstration of personal and collective identity alignment at times is discussed 
in terms of what the individual and group are not. Howard stresses that because as 
individuals we are motivated to evaluate ourselves positively, people ‘tend to 
evaluate positively those groups to which they belong and to discriminate against 
groups they perceive to pose a threat to their social identity’.324 But it leads to the 
question, if strong identification with a group can be correlated with out-group 
hostility? In making identifications an individual or group sets up boundaries and 
these boundaries and these boundaries determine who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’, thus 
identity or identifying becomes relational, constructed against an ‘other’ or a set of 
‘others’. Dawson and Amarasingam’s interviews with foreign fighters in Syria noted 
that interactions they had recorded were ‘laced with comments about the need to 
be strict in observing the differences between true Muslims and others’.325 
 
 
322 Donatella Della Porta & Mario Diani Social Movements  p.94.  
323 Donatella Della Porta & Mario Diani Social Movements p.102. 
324 Judith A. Howard “Social Psychology of Identities” in Annual Review of Sociology, (2000), pp.367-
393, p.369. 
325 Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam “Talking to Foreign Fighters” p.202. 
 86 
Social identity theory maintains that it is identification that causes out-group bias.326 
As the individual becomes more embedded with the group and indeed becomes an 
extension of it and its identity, social identity theory holds that nearly all groups 
possess the implicit (or increasingly) explicit belief that they are in some way unique 
or superior to others.327 Many terrorist groups identify certain “out” groups as 
enemies. The membership is then conditioned to deindividuate members of the 
enemy group. One school of thought is that there is a correlation between “us versus 
them” thinking and absolutist religious belief systems, wherein those adherents 
advance the view that the world is divided into believers and nonbelievers. This 
thinking subsequently provides the justification for efforts to convert, subjugate, or 
eliminate those identified as nonbelievers.328 This is illustrative in the tweet below 
which emanated from the wife of a popular British foreign fighter, who operated his 
propaganda machine while he was on the battlefield. Note the repetitious use of the 
term “them”.  
                                    
 
 
Enemy deindividuation includes giving up any personal relationships with enemy 
group members, knowing or referring to any enemies by individual name, or 
distinguishing any individual attributes or characteristics among enemy members. All 
enemies become a homogeneous, faceless mass: they all look alike, think alike, and 
act alike. Under these circumstances and conditions, the construction of identity 
therefore implies both a positive definition of those participating in a certain group, 
and a negative identification of those who are not only excluded but also actively 
opposed.329 The word kuffar or disbelievers is an all-inclusive derogatory term that 
summarises well the enemy deindividation referred to.  
 
326 Judith A. Howard “Social Psychology of Identities” p.370. 
327 Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour” pp.7-24. 
328 Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel & Alan S. Waterman “Terrorism” p.541. 
329 Donatella Della Porta & Mario Diani Social Movements p.94; Alain Touraine The Voice and the Eye: 
An Analysis of Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Alberto Melucci 
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Stahelski contends that all of his five phases, are achieved or facilitated by the 
presence of the charismatic leader, whom he appears to imply is a physical presence. 
This raises the question as to whether this model accurately applies to foreign 
fighters and those whose radicalisation is now commonly processed and facilitated 
via online means. Perhaps, given Stahelski’s research is not specific to a particular 
type of terrorism and more based on comparisons with cults, it is therefore ripe for 
review in the context of online means of pathways to terrorism through 
radicalisation and would be a valuable area for further research. It is not possible to 
disprove that the internet facilitates sufficient virtual connection with such 
charismatic leaders however, this does not imply that social networking sites (SNS) 
have replaced the physical presence of a groups leader. Unlike groups such as Aum 
Shinrikyo where its members had the geographic disposition and small membership 
that would have potentially facilitated actual interaction with the group’s leader 
Shoko Asahara, ISIS’s or similar violent jihadist groups in Syria are widely dispersed 
and therefore British volunteers would be highly unlikely to ever physically 
encounter a member of the core leadership 
 
Impression Management and Self-Presentation 
A range of literature demonstrates that there is the potential for a degree of 
production and creativity in how one portrays themselves, especially online. Writing 
many decades ago, Erving Goffman proffered that personal and collective identities 
are products of impression management work.330 In his work Goffman uses the 
metaphor of an actor performing a role in a play to explain how people 
communicate or express messages to an audience. Goffman notes, ‘the very 
structure of the self can be seen in terms of how we arrange for such 
performances’.331 Social media and in particular social networking sites (SNS) have 
had a significant impact on self-presentation to an audience. They provide ample 
 
Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996); Belinda Robnett “External Political Events and Collective Identity” in David Meyer, Nancy 
Whittier, and Belinda Robnett (eds.) Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) pp.287–301. 
330 Erving Goffman The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1959). 
331 Erving Goffman The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life p.252.  
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opportunities to fashion desirable and often misleading impressions as users have 
more control over their self-presentational behaviour than in face-to face 
communication, and therefore they provide an ideal setting for precise impression 
management. The example of Eamonn Bradley from Co. Derry in Northern Ireland 
exemplifies how he transformed his identity from what can be judged to be an 
average office worker to medieval-style combatant online. In the image on the right, 
Bradley’s presentation is akin to a Lawrence of Arabia-like character demonstrating 
the power that social media’s imagery affords in self-presentation. Prior to his 
departure for Syria Bradley used social media to research the fighting, convert to 
Islam and make contact with people who told him how to get there. 
 
   
        
People engage in self-presentation as a means of creating their identities. One of the 
most illustrative cases of online impression management and self-presentation 
strategies is the peculiar case of the Indian business man Mehdi Masroor Biswas 
based in Bangalore which assumed the handle @ShamiWitness for use on Twitter. 
The ICSR report which examined how foreign fighters in Syria receive information 
about the conflict and who inspires them identified Biwas’ Twitter as the most-
followed332 and after his arrest he was described as ‘the single most important 
English language disseminator of Islamic State propaganda’.333 Interestingly, when 
interviewed by Channel 4 news, the Indian businessman did not refer to himself as 
Shami Witness, but referred to his assumed Twitter identity in the third person, and 
when arrested by police his actual appearance varied drastically from his Twitter 
 
332 Joseph Carter, Shiraz Maher and Peter Neumann, #Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and 
Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks, ICSR, 01 April 2014, p.18. 
333 Shiraz Maher “Shami Witness unmasked: 'I will not resist arrest'”, Channel 4 News, available at 
http://www.channel4.com/news/police-bangalore-islamic-state-twitter-shami-witness (last accessed 
12 December 2014). 
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profile picture. This disseminator (as he would be categorised by ICSR’s research) 
appears to have become embedded in the virtual community of ISIS Twitter 
supporters by assuming a different persona, and is illustrative of the self-




According to eminent sociologist, Mead, identity is ultimately imitative from society, 
people sometimes “self-symbolise”, that is, engage in public behaviours that indicate 
the possession of identity-relevant characteristics. A pertinent example of this 
referred to in the previous chapter is the index finger salute common in foreign 
fighter imagery posted online. This symbol of Tawheed is assumed to be utilised in 





The Dichotomous British-Muslim Identity 
At a sociological level, the definition of Muslim identity becomes very difficult 
because of the immense diversity amongst Muslims. Similar to the terms British or 
Bangladeshi, the term Muslim encompasses so many different identity 
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characteristics and variations that it needs further elaboration to be meaningful. 
While it is the religion that makes a Muslim a Muslim and not their culture, some 
scholars seek to shift the focus to cultural practices and intricacies of following the 
Islamic faith. Tufyal Choudhury’s research on British Muslims and the identity 
choices that are available to them found that Jihadi narratives and state responses to 
them have produced a dichotomy between “good” and “bad” Muslims that has 
challenged young British Muslims’ self-perceptions.334 
 
Sadek Hamid’s research informs us that the 1990s were the defining era for second-
generation Islamic revival and activism in the UK.335  Those who joined the Salafi 
da’wa movement in Britain meant ‘acquiring membership of a multi-ethnic 
supranational identity’.336  
 
Membership of a jama ’ a (association) provided the strong friendship networks 
that are a by-product of group identity, and are especially important for Muslim 
youth keen to escape racism and feel part of something bigger than themselves. 
These informal networks provided opportunities to develop an Islamic identity…337 
 
Quintan Wiktorowicz’s study on al Muhajiroun provides a relevant and confirmatory 
example of this. According to his research, most of those who eventually became 
members of al Muhajiroun experienced a serious identity crisis prior to their initial 
stages of participation, and that subsequent to the process of deindividuation an al 
Muhajiroun member was found to think about their identity in terms of religion.338 
The adoption of this collective identity by the group member has resulted in he/she 
now becoming an extension of the collective whole.339  
 
Mohammed Sidique Khan, one of the perpetrators of the 7th July bombings in 
London in 2005 claimed in his subsequent martyrdom video that his actions were in 
retaliation for “the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people.” 
 
334 Tufyal Choudhary quoted in Emmanuel Karagiannis “Defining and Understanding the Jihadi-Salafi 
Movement”, p.189. 
335 Sadek Hamid “The Attraction of Authentic Islam” p.390. 
336 Sadek Hamid “The Attraction of Authentic Islam” p.391. 
337 Sadek Hamid “The Attraction of Authentic Islam” p.391. 
338 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam.” Paper presented at 
“The Roots of Islamic Radicalism”Conference, Yale University, (May 8-9, 2004), 
http://yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/papers/wiktorowicz-paper.pdf p.17. 
339 Dina Al Raffie, "Social Identity Theory for Investigating Islamic Extremism in the Diaspora", p.77. 
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However, Shiraz Maher interrogates this by questioning how Khan came to identify 
with the people of Iraq, a country whose native language he could not speak and 
that he had never visited. Khan was born in Leeds, the son of Pakistani immigrant 
parents, who was a university graduate and active in his local community assisting in 
the teaching of disadvantaged children.340 Therefore, on first glance at least four 
individual identities can be identified i.e. first generation British; Pakistani heritage; 
university graduate and; youth and community worker. Maher accounts for the 
reason that Khan identified with the people in Iraq during his last testament video by 
suggesting that there is an inextricable link between radicalisation and identity, and 
that it is this same identity and belonging nexus that accounts for the foreign fighter 
movement today.341  The research by Hunt and Benford could assist in interpreting 
Mohammed Sidique Khan’s claims in that they identify ‘atrocity tales’ as being 
important in the construction of the person’s personal identity and the need to 
convey that the person does not support injustices but rather is sensitive to the 






Hunt and Benford’s research found that participants’ accounts of entry into peace 
and justice movements was often characterised by ‘disillusionment anecdotes…a 
type of take that follows a formula of “once I was blind, but now I can see”’.343 What 
 
340 UK Government Report of the Official Account of the Bombings London on 7th July 2005 p.13 
available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228837/1087.pdf 
(last accessed 12 May 2017)  
341 Shiraz Maher “ICSR Insight – The roots of radicalisation? It’s identity, stupid”. 
342 Scott A. Hunt & Robert D. Benford “Identity Talk in the Peace and Justice Movement” p.499-500. 
343 Scott A. Hunt & Robert D. Benford “Identity Talk in the Peace and Justice Movement” p.497. 
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has been illustrated thus far is that movement identities involve fostering esprit de 
corps, create the conditions for increasing self-esteem, and define in-group/out-
group relationships.344  This chapter, more so than the others, asks the fundamental 
question of why an individual would become a foreign fighter, as it involves 
assuming a different identity. There are divergent opinions in the literature but the 
evidence suggests that there is reasonable reason to argue that an identity crisis or 
cognitive opening, as Wiktorowicz would describe, is responsible for the initial steps 
taken toward a violent pathway. Quantifying this is almost impossible as it is a 
psycho-social process at play. However, with the assistance of narrative 
communication, a terrorist group can utilise identity-stripping and deindividuation in 
their attempt to co-opt a person into their group. The co-optee’s employment of 
impression management and self-presentation skills while marking out their group 
versus the others is evident in a hostile manner in ISIS social media.  The markers of 
an identity correlated with Salafist-Jihadist ideology is also evident in social media 
imagery which demonstrates the fighters in various poses and attires which reflect 



















This thesis has argued that narratives are crucial elements of identity formation as 
they provide coherent and brief explanations about who ‘we’ are, where we come 
from and where we are heading, and they define who the ‘other’ is.345 Master 
narratives it has been demonstrated, can affect an individuals’ perception of 
themselves, leading to changes in self-conception, particularly when individuals 
identify with a character.346 The individual, we have seen, has a place in the narrative 
process, they adjust stories to fit their own identities, and they will tailor “reality” to 
fit their stories.347 In some instances, exposure to a narrative was demonstrated to 
have involved deep immersion into the story and events, and identification with the 
protagonists in a process referred to as transportation into the narrative world. 
 
A key driver of Salafi-Jihadi violence is political imaginary associated with a global 
imagined community, and it is this which is the most significant finding in the 
research. These Salafi-Jihadis identify with and feel part of the Ummah, which is a 
brotherhood and sisterhood of geographically and ethnically diversified people with 
whom they can identify closely. By joining such a transnational entity, they find a 
larger-than-life cause: they are involved in an open-ended religious conflict between 
the Ummah and its perceived enemies which has scant regard for traditional 
Westphalian borders. Indeed, a new transnational identity has been constructed. For 
those who have travelled to conflict zones, in their eyes, this experience alone 
confirms the existence of an embattled Ummah, which needs their support and 
dedication. In effect, it can be argued that Salafi-Jihadism is an unintended side 
effect of globalisation, which has created a new class of international warriors with 
loyalty only to their imagined Ummah.  
 
 
345 Alexander Spencer, Romantic Narratives in International Politics: Pirates, Rebels and Mercenaries 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016) pp. 28-32. 
346 Marc Sestir and Melanie C. Green, “You are What You Watch: Identification and Transportation 
Effects on Temporary Self-Concept” Social Influence 54:3 (2010) pp.272-288. 
347 Margaret Somers “The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A relational and network approach” 
Theory and Society, 23 (1994) p.618. 
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The impact which social media and in particular Twitter had on the Syrian conflict 
has yet to be fully determined. But from existing literature we are led to believe that 
events and functionalities conspired to make it ‘an ideal place for violent extremists 
to operate’.348 Given the body of literature highlighted in this thesis, which suggests 
that imagery can evoke a visceral response that is absent of text, the representation 
of Salafi-Jihadi’s narratives in Syria were often more communicative in their pictures 
alone. One of the most common images observed was their conveying of one of the 
most fundamental beliefs in Islam, Tawhid, through one-fingered posing for 
example.  
 
The debate which exists as to the role of ideology and religiosity in UK foreign fighter 
recruitment is likely to rumble on for some time. There is certainly convincing 
evidence for both sides of the debate in the existing literature. Recalling Thomas 
Precht’s research which attempted to understand a person’s trajectory and 
motivations to partake in a foreign fight, he identified opportunity factors. There 
were a number of opportunity factors which also played an important part and were 
not examined in this project, such as the availability of low-cost air travel and visa-
free travel to Syria circa 2012-2015.  
 
Limitations/Weaknesses of this Study 
What this project aimed to achieve was shine a light on a very specific area of 
research, the social media use of foreign fighters to convey narratives of Salafi-
Jihadism, while also reviewing existing literature on the specific topic of empirical 
research. A shortcoming of this approach, as mentioned above, was that the primary 
sources were likely to be skewed given that de-classified intelligence has confirmed 
that foreign fighters had their internet connectivity removed on arrival until basic 
training was complete. Therefore any commentary arising after their indoctrination 
was completed was liable to be replete with Salafi-Jihadist ideology and religiosity in 
keeping with the master narrative of Salafi-Jihadi groups in Syria. Notwithstanding 
this, the project in certain sections weighted for this by drawing on more secondary 
 
348 Charlie Winter “Documenting the Virtual ‘Caliphate’” p.11. 
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resources to compliment the primary data. What has been achieved is an exposition 
of how British Salafi-Jihadis conducted themselves in Syria on social media, how they 
engaged in self-presentation, espoused the collective group identity while 
denigrating the disbelievers. 
 
To elevate the status of such research, more primary detail should be gathered 
where possible. Furthermore, to gain a more complete and representative sample, 
an effort should be made to expand beyond English language only content. I was 
fortunate by the fact that there was an abundance of published material available to 
capitalise on, but that is not a substitute for more primary research being 
undertaken 
 
King’s College London provided an enviable environment for a terrorist researcher 
during the height of the Syrian conflict. The presence of the ICSR contributed to the 
status of the University as being a centre of excellence in researching the British 
foreign fighter phenomenon. It is with regret that I was not able to engage more in 
this community with the exception of ad hoc conference attendances. Of particular 
assistance to my studies was the European Union-funded academic research 
network VOX-Pol, formed in the summer of 2014, and while I engaged in their 
conferences, my research would probably have benefitted from attending their 
summer schools in the years since, where they specifically discussed topics such 
violent online radicalisation, ethics in terrorism research, and the challenges of 
online Jihadism beyond the English language.  
 
Recommendations for future research 
While I limited this study to analysing text and images, YouTube in particular, 
deserves a study of its own, given the high prominence of the videos posted on that 
site in the conflict. While one of my pieces of primary research referred to “Jihadi 
John”, the narratives contained in videos that were captured which featured 
Mohammed Emwazi, known more widely by his nomme de guerre are rich data 
sources for future research, given his status as a British citizen and home-grown 
terrorist. Furthermore, the example of Jihadi John’s rise to prominence in August 
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2014 best illustrates the need to be reactive and prepared to adapt the research 
question as events are unfolding. When I formulated this research project Jihadi 
John was unknown. Another area worthy of further research, which was briefly 
referred to in this project surrounds converts representation among foreign fighters, 
and in the context of Britain, would make for potentially a very impacting 
contribution.  
 
Anyone who wishes to engage in research in a similar way as I did in a future conflict 
will undoubtedly face the challenges presented by encrypted communications. 
Lessons learned from Syria and Iraq will inform those willing to travel and participate 
in a conflict beyond their own borders that social media engagement can lead to 
prosecution on terrorism offences in your home country after the fact. Furthermore, 
the technology companies have increased their capability in content moderation in 
recent years and its unlikely to see a repeat of the open communications seen from 
Syria. Any researcher will require training and also a cautious approach to accessing 
data from encrypted and potentially compromised or surveilled platforms.  
 
Policy Recommendations 
The importance of a public private partnership in this space, particularly in my place 
of domicile, Ireland is a key policy recommendation. Dublin as host to the EMEA 
headquarters of companies such as Twitter, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, results in a 
high concentration of expertise located herein that is not being leveraged by the 
public sector. Establishing a forum under Chatham House Rules where both groups 
could share their experiences would have been ideal, but given the secretive nature 
of the state agencies charged with protecting national security, even workshops ran 
by the tech firms would have possibly been a more palatable first start.  
 
The academic community have proven their capability to make sound policy 
recommendations grounded in empirical research findings. Having spent a significant 
amount of time on the “policy-maker” side of the academic/policy-maker divide, and 
dabbled in the academic side, I would have to compel those who engage in research 
to make it as accessible as possible to policy makers, which I understand can be 
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difficult or even unpalatable, but journal articles are, more often than not, in my 
opinion deemed too inaccessible to policy makers. That’s not to suggest a wanton 
abandon of the system in place, but perhaps by writing op-eds for newspapers or 
actively engaging in public consultation sessions will attempt to bridge the divide, 
real or perceived. In the UK for example, the ICSR’s engagement with the BBC and 
the Guardian made their work accessible to mainstream readership and informed 
public debate. Furthermore, the use of social media platforms such as Twitter, and 
even LinkedIn by academics to comment on public policy or global events is a step 
towards making their valued contributions accessible to a wider audience.  
 
In Ireland, the more systemic issue is the absence of a home office equivalent in 
which contributes to the lack of a unified and centralised approach to issues of 
security and intelligence. The equivalent in the UK provides an umbrella under which 
groups such as UK’s Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Centre, the Research and Information Unit and even the security services 
must operate beneath allows for better coordination of effort and intelligence 
sharing. A competent authority would be in a strong position to engage with the 
private sector based in the country, which has been severely lacking. 
 
Final Thoughts  
While European intelligence and security chiefs remain deeply concerned at the 
prospect of these fighters returning home and bringing with them their violent 
means and ideology, as researchers we should be focussing on their life after the 
battlefield from a social psychological perspective: i.e. who do the fighters associate 
with on return home, how religious is their appearance and language, and 
fundamentally, do they ascribe to the notion that the Caliphate is an achievable goal.  
The UK has responded to the phenomenon of foreign fighters from Britain travelling 
to fight in Syria through a range of soft and hard responses and coupled with the 
Russian intervention in 2015, numbers undertaking the hijrah have dwindled 
substantially.  Notwithstanding this 2017 was the bloodiest year on mainland UK 
arising from Islamist-inspired terrorist attack since 2007, and the recently released 
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Contest Strategy (4.0) firmly identifies the role that narratives play in the 
mobilisation of people to terrorist actions 
using pernicious, divisive messaging and amplifying perceived grievances, Daesh and Al 
Qa’ida exploit the internet to promote warped alternative narratives, urging extremists 
within our own communities to subvert our way of life through simple, brutal 
violence.349 
 
There is little doubt that the next battleground for Salafi-Jihadist groups will 
generate its own unique characteristics and that what we saw in Syria and then Iraq 
is highly unlikely to be repeated. During the time that this project was conducted the 
Syrian crises evolved beyond initial recognition. When I began the initial scoping in 
2013, ISIS did not exist in its current form, and even at that it has changed beyond 
recognition losing an estimated 97% of the territory it controlled at its peak in 2014. 
The documentation through social media, particularly Twitter, of the conflict 
through the eyes of those Britons who made the journey provided researchers and 
the general public with a unique observatory into a space previously unseen. It was 
both fascinating and chilling and created the opportunity to ask the “why” as 
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